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Abstract
This dissertation examines how information is translated into issue definitions. Is-
sue definitions—the way that policy issues are understood—have long been noted
to be important for policy choices. In this project, I develop a model of issue defi-
nitions where issues are understood as a function of the various dimensions of the
issue weighted by the importance of each dimension. I then incorporate this model
into the theory of information processing developed by Jones and Baumgartner
(2005). The theory of information processing posits that information can be un-
derstood as signals in the policymaking environment, and information processing
is the collection and prioritizing of those signals. In this dissertation, I model these
information signals as the salience of each dimension of an issue.
Using the case of used nuclear fuel (UNF) management, this dissertation test
hypotheses about the nature of issue definitions and policy change, institutions,
and policy actors. Specifically, I estimate the dimensions of the UNF issue using
latent Dirichlet allocation, a type of quantitative text analysis. Following the
development of the UNF dimensions, I test hypotheses about how the salience of
these dimensions are related to policy change, how institutional structures influence
dimension salience, and how policy actors systematically highlight some dimensions
over others.
ix
Chapter 1
Issue Definitions, Information Processing, and
Policymaking
In February 2010 the Obama Administration asked the Department of Energy to
withdraw the license application for Yucca Mountain that had previously been sub-
mitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This action seems to have sealed
the fate of Yucca Mountain, the place that had been designated as the sole reposi-
tory for the country’s used nuclear fuel (UNF). The selection and consideration of
Yucca Mountain as the solution to the nation’s problem of the increasing amount of
radioactive material gathering at various nuclear power facilities, was a nearly four
decade process. While policy development has occurred, the basic policy dilemma
remains; what should be done with this material?
The examination of the issue of used nuclear material allows important insights
into the policymaking process, particularly within policy areas that are steeped in
scientific and technical information, controversial, and possess a long time horizon.1
Scholars of the policy process have long noted the importance of how issues are
understood, and how these issue definitions can shape policy choices (Stone, 1989;
Rochefort and Cobb, 1993; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). In addition, scholars
have noted the importance of information for the development of policy issues
1Indeed, the Environmental Protection Agency is required to develop exposure regulations
that stretch out to 1 million years.
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(Krehbiel, 1991; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005;
Workman, Jones and Jochim, 2009). Less attention has been paid however, to
how information is translated into issue definitions. Given the long time frame
and complexities of handling used nuclear material, that issue is an ideal one for
examining the importance of information and the process by which information
shapes how issues are understood. In this dissertation, I posit that issue definitions
are based on how the dimensions of a policy issue are weighted by policy actors
and institutions and that these weights shape the information available to policy
makers. In addition, I examine how issue definitions shift and evolve over time
both leading to and following policy change.
In short, the dissertation will examine how information is refracted through
actors and institutions to produce issue definitions and how those issue definitions
evolve over time. I use the issue of UNF management to test hypotheses about the
role of actors, institutions, and policy change in shaping how issues are understood.
This first chapter briefly describes the nature of the research about the policy
process, and describes the model of issue definitions that I develop. Following
that discussion, I describe the theoretical framework I use to understand how
information is used to define policy issues. Next, I give a brief background on UNF
management. Finally, I provide a broad overview of the subsequent chapters.
1.1 Understanding the Policy Process
From the outside, the policymaking process can seem to be either largely idiosyn-
cratic or driven by partisanship and political ambition. However, scholars have
been able to draw out many systematic patterns within the policymaking process
and these patterns have formed the basis of multiple frameworks and theories about
such topics as policy change, policy learning, and information processing. Some
of the early attempts to systematically characterize the policy process included
2
Table 1.1: Policy Process and the Levels of Analysis
Level Constituent Parts Description
Macro
Policymaking Institutions The formal policy making institu-
tions
Policy Regimes/Linked Subsystems Issues or problems that span multi-
ple subsystems
Meso
Subsystem A set of actors engaged in a bounded
substantive issue area
Coalitions Collection of allied
groups/individuals that share
policy core beliefs and preferences
Micro Individuals Individual units within a coalition;
could include a single organization
or group, or individuals such as
members of Congress, policy en-
trepreneurs, or public managers
Lowi’s typologies (Lowi, 1972) and the policy stages model or “heuristic” (Brewer
and deLeon, 1983; Jones, 1984; deLeon, 1999). Both Lowi’s typology and the
stages model were found to lack the theoretical and empirical rigor to be classified
as proper theories, largely due to a lack of properly specified causal mechanisms
(Sabatier, 1991). As a result, a wide array of frameworks and theories of the policy
process began to proliferate and continue to be developed (Sabatier, 2007; Nowlin,
2011).
The various frameworks and theories differ from each other by the levels of
analysis and the levels of abstraction in which they focus. Levels of analysis refers
to the level or levels (macro, meso, micro) in which policy action is taking place
(Redford, 1969). Policy scholars focus on the most pertinent level for the specific
question(s) they are addressing. Each of the varying levels contain different aggre-
gations of institutions and actors and focus on different decision processes. The
various levels, their parts, and a brief description are shown in Table 1.1.
At the macro level, scholars tend to focus on the large policymaking institutions
such as Congress, the Executive, and the Judiciary. Scholars at the macro level
3
are often focused on questions of institutional adjustment and response across
a wide range of policy issues (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005; Workman, 2009).
Nested between the macro and meso levels are policy issues that span multiple
policy subsystems, but are linked by common actors, institutions, or arguments.
Examples of these types of issues include climate change and homeland security
(Jones and Jenkins-Smith, 2009; May, Jochim and Sapotichne, 2011). The meso
level includes the subsystem, which is the set of actors and institutions concerned
with a particular policy issue, and coalitions, a collection of actors bound by shared
beliefs and policy preferences within a subsystem. Finally, the micro level is focused
on particular groups or individuals active on a policy issue.2
Apart from levels of analysis, policy theories also vary by level of abstraction.
At the highest level of abstraction are frameworks, which “bound inquiry” and
“direct the attention” of scholars (Schlager, 2007, 293). Frameworks can “pro-
vide anything from a skeletal set of variables (or variables sets) to something as
extensive as a paradigm”(Sabatier 2007, 322). Once a framework is established,
theories can be put forward based on the concepts identified as important in the
framework. For example, within the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is a
theory of policy learning (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Theories identify and “place
values” on variables, they also “posit relationships among the variables” and they
“make predictions about likely outcomes” (Schlager 2007, 296). Models are de-
veloped and used to “test specific parts of theories by fixing a limited number
of variables at specific settings and exploring the outcomes produced” (Schlager
2007, 294). Hypotheses are then generated from a model and test specific cause
and effect relationships among variables. Moving from a framework to a theory
and from there to a model and finally to set of hypotheses implies logically coherent
2Several of the prominent policy frameworks, including the Institutional Analysis and Devel-
opment Framework (IAD) (Ostrom, 2007), the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier
and Weible, 2007), and the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) (Shanahan, Jones and McBeth,
2011) touch on each of the three levels.
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relationships that become increasing specific and more narrow in scope (Sabatier
2007, 323).
This dissertation develops and tests a model of issue definitions. Policy scholars
have long noted the importance of how policy issues are defined. The way that
issues are understood, either as “policy images” (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993),
“problem definitions” (Rochefort and Cobb, 1993), “social constructions” (Schnei-
der and Ingram, 1993), “policy narratives” (Jones and McBeth, 2010), or “frames”
(Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2008) can have profound impacts on the politics of
the issue and on ultimate policy choices. Despite the use of these various terms,
each are connected to the same underlying phenomenon; the way that issues are
understood by elite policy actors and the mass public. The major focus of this
dissertation is develop an approach to better understand how issues come to be
defined. As noted, this concept is an important component within many of the
policy process theories, therefore finding a way to better model how issues are
defined allows for empirical tests of multiple theories. The next section describes
the theoretical approach to modeling issue definitions, and Chapter 2 will discuss
the empirical modeling of issue dimensions and definitions.
1.2 Modeling Issue Definitions
Policy scholars have long been concerned with how policy issues are understood and
the implications of those understandings for both policy designs (Schneider and
Ingram, 1993), and the politics surrounding the issue (Lowi, 1972). Traditionally in
the literature issue definitions have largely been conflated with problem definitions,
and have largely focused on questions of agenda setting. How do “conditions” that
exist in the world become “problems” on the policymaking agenda (Kingdon, 1984;
Stone, 1989; Rochefort and Cobb, 1993; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Wood and
Doan, 2003). Stone (1989) argued that conditions become problems once a causal
5
story is developed that can attribute blame for the problem on the actions of some
individuals or groups. Once a causal story is in place, the condition is more likely
to be seen as something that can be effectively dealt with and is therefore more
likely to be placed on the agenda. Wood and Doan (2003) develop a threshold
model of problem definitions and argue that conditions become problems once
those conditions pass a certain threshold among a critical mass of individuals,
thereby forcing institutions into action.
Beyond problem definitions and agenda setting, other scholars have noted other
ways that issue definitions can impact policy processes. Punctuated Equilibrium
Theory (PET) notes the important role that policy images play in facilitating
policy change. In particular, changing policy images interact with policy venues to
produce large-scale “punctuated” policy changes (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).
For example, the nuclear energy subsystem experienced rapid shifts as the policy
image changed from positive to negative and attracted new policy actors across
new policy venues.
More recent work argues that policies can be characterized (i.e., defined) by
their relevant attributes and the salience (i.e., importance) assigned to those at-
tributes (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). This policy characterization approach
is based on an attribute-based understanding of information processing (Jones,
1996; Jones, Talbert and Potoski, 2003). Attributes, or dimensions, of policy is-
sues are the underlying characteristics of the issue that serve as the basis of policy
choices. These attributes make up a multi-attribute problem space of attributes
and salience weights that changes over time. While the problem space is multi-
dimensional, the separate choice space, where issue attributes are combined and
arrayed, is uni-dimensional (Jones, 1994b; Jones, Talbert and Potoski, 2003). Poli-
cymaking institutions reduce the multidimensional issue space to a uni-dimensional
choice space (Talbert and Potoski, 2002). Often this uni-dimensional choice space
6
aligns with liberal and conservative ideology (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997).
The model of issue definitions that I propose builds on this past work, but is
intended to be more generalized. In essence the model attempts to explain how is-
sues are understood. The basic assumption of the model is that issues are complex
and contain multiple attributes that exist in a multidimensional issue space. These
dimensions can include problem indicators (e.g., unemployment rate, amount of
greenhouse gas in the atmosphere), problem causation or origin, and possible so-
lutions (Rochefort and Cobb, 1993). A somewhat semantic, but important point
of departure in the approach I propose from the policy characterization approach
of Jones and Baumgartner (2005) is how I deal with the question of separate
problem and choice spaces. In brief, I propose an issue space which can contain
dimensions related to both problems and solutions. While a long line of policy
scholars, most notably Kingdon (1984), have noted that policy problems and so-
lutions can develop separately and independently, I am most interested in how
issues are constructed though a process of combining and weighting the various
dimensions—both problem and solution—of the issue. This is important because,
depending on the weight assigned to it, the proposed policy solution can have sig-
nificant impact in the way the entire issue is understood. For example, recent work
dealing with climate change policy solutions has shown that altering the proposed
solution by advocating for increased use of nuclear energy (Kahan et al., 2007)
or geo-engineering (Kahan et al., 2012) can alter the views that individuals have
of the climate change issue. In particular, those that are likely to assign less risk
to climate change and be more supportive of nuclear energy or geo-engineering,
can be compelled to assign greater risk to climate change when nuclear energy or
geo-engineering is offered as a solution. So, attaching a dimension that is salient
to an issue can alter the issue space, and therefore redefine the issue.
A second assumption is that policy actors, particularly in conflictual policy
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areas, will have differing issue definitions. Indeed, these varying definitions are
what structure the conflict. Therefore, modeling the various issue definitions can
provide insight into the nature of policy conflict and resolution. A third and final
assumption is that issue definitions are dynamic and change or evolve over time.
The issue definition model (IDM) is intended to provide a generalizable model
of how policy issues are understood. It assumes a multidimensional issue space,
policy actors that vary in their definition of the issue, and definitions are dynamic.
By assuming that actors define issues differently, I mean that policy actors vary
in the salience that they attach to each dimension of the issue. Salience is defined
as the importance of a particular dimension and the centrality of a dimension for
understanding the policy issue. Therefore, a dimension that is considered highly
salient is seen as a) important and b) central to how the issue is understood. The
model can be expressed more formally as:
IDa =
n∑
i=1
si
where si is the salience of dimension i for issue a.
This simply means that issue definitions can be theoretically modeled as a function
of the sum of each dimension weighted by its salience. Note that the model above
is expressed as static, or the issue definition at time t. However, the salience of
dimensions can vary over time making issue definitions dynamic. The dynamic
element of issue definitions is a function of the changing salience si that results
from the competition between policy actors over time. The sum assigned to the
issue definition would be arbitrary, but the relative distance could be measured
in a Euclidean space, similar to the way in which political scientists calculate
spatial models. However, in the empirical model, discussed in detail in Chapter
2, I measure the salience attached to each dimension by measuring the proportion
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of verbal Congressional testimony that is about each dimension. In this approach
each dimension is assigned a proportion for each witness statement, and these
proportions sum to one. As a result, the empirical model estimates the salience
that each actor attaches to each dimension, but does not provide a summation.
The IDM could be used to test hypotheses across a variety of the policy process
theories, however in this dissertation I leverage the IDM to better understand how
policy information is created by and filtered through competitive policy actors and
institutions to construct issue definitions. Therefore, I build on insights offered by
the theory of information processing developed by Bryan Jones and his colleagues
(Jones and Baumgartner, 2005; Workman, Jones and Jochim, 2009). The next
section describes the theoretical framework I apply in the dissertation.
1.3 Information Processing and Issue Definitions
Policy scholars have long noted the importance of information to the policy pro-
cess. Information can include objective indicators (Wood and Doan, 2003), sci-
ence and technical information (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993), policy analysis
(Weiss, 1977; Jenkins-Smith, 1990), and public opinion (Burstein, 2003). Tradi-
tional understandings of information in the policymaking process treated infor-
mation as costly for policymakers to acquire, thereby causing information to be
under-supplied (e.g., Niskanen, 1971). However, more recently scholars have ar-
gued that information is in fact oversupplied and that costs are associated with
how to prioritize this information (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005; Workman, Jones
and Jochim, 2009). The amount of information that is supplied likely varies across
policy issues (Boswell, 2012) and over time, with mature subsystems likely having
a richer information environment than nascent subsystems.
In an environment where information is oversupplied, policymakers are con-
stantly bombarded with information that is generated by multiple sources includ-
9
ing interest groups, Congressional committees, federal agencies, and the media.
Policymakers must then decide what pieces of information are most important.
In this context, information is defined as “signals” from the environment, and
information processing consists of the “collecting, assembling, interpreting, and
prioritizing” of those signals (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005, 7). The information
that is generated varies, not only by source, by also by substance. Drawing from
communications theory, Jones, Baumgartner and de la Mare (2005) argues that an
information signal (i.e., message) is passed from a source to a receiver. This can
be illustrated as:
Source → Message (Information Signal) → Receiver
An information signal moves from a source to a receiver, and the receiver subse-
quently processes the signal.
The receiver is this scenario are policymaking institutions, and these institu-
tions subsequently process—collect, assemble, interpret, and prioritize—the mul-
titude of information signals. But these institutions, much like individuals, are
“boundedly rational” and have a limited ability to effectively process all of the
incoming signals (Jones, 2001). Institutions are largely path dependent and these
dependencies can create institutional friction that can slow the recognition of new
and important information in the environment. This friction also leads to dis-
proportionate information processing, where some information is weighted heavily
and other information ignored. Policy decisions are made following the processing
of information, and this process can lead to decisions that are either incremental,
reflecting small changes, or punctuated reflecting large changes (Jones and Baum-
gartner, 2005). The nature, including the amount and quality, of the information
likely plays a role in whether changes are incremental or punctuated, with punc-
tuations being more likely in policy areas that with sparse information (Boswell,
2012). Figure 1.1 illustrates this process, where the thick arrow from information
10
Figure 1.1: Information Processing
Information Institution Decision
to institutions represents the large quantity of information signals that is directed
at policymaking institutions, and the thinner arrow from institutions to decision
reflects how information is filtered, or managed, by the institutions prior to a policy
decision being made.
While the approach discussed above contains important insights into how infor-
mation and institutions operate at the macro level, it is not as clear in explaining
how information is translated into issue definitions—which is a critical step in
moving from information processing to policy choices—at the meso, or subsystem
level. The central question of this dissertation can be stated as: Given what we
know about the importance of how issues are defined and given what we know about
the role of information in the policy process, how does information lead to issue
definitions? To answer this question, I examine how information is generated and
processed by the multiple policymaking institutions and actors that operate within
policy subsystems. Specifically, to integrate the issue definition model into the in-
formation processing framework outlined above, I operationalize the information
signal as being the dimension that is most salient (i.e., important) to the source.
Such that:
Source → Salient Dimension → Receiver
It is likely that there are differences among the various sources about which di-
11
Figure 1.2: The Structure of Information Competition
Congress
Committee A Committee B Committee C
Policy Actor A Policy Actor B Policy Actor C Policy Actor D Policy Actor E Policy Actor F Policy Actor G Policy Actor H Policy Actor I
mensions should be most salient, and these differences likely vary in systematic
and predictable ways. Furthermore, these differences create competition among
sources in determining how an issue comes to be defined. These dynamics are
explored in the subsequent chapters, and the sources of information I examine in-
clude the various Congressional committees and policy actors involved in the UNF
subsystem.
In brief, I argue that issues are defined within policy subsystems, where insti-
tutional sub-units and policy actors specialize in particular issues and attempt to
define those issues by signaling the salient dimension to policymakers. However,
the multidimensional nature of many policy issues create large information costs
for policymakers. These costs are associated with searching for information when
it is under-supplied, or processing information when it is oversupplied. To reduce
these costs, policymakers within an institution (e.g., Congress) delegate to sub-
units within the institution (e.g., Congressional committees), and these sub-units
further delegate to other actors outside the institution. This process is illustrated
in Figure 1.2.
As shown, Congress delegates information gathering and processing to various
committees, and these committees draw on other policy actors to signal the salient
dimensions of an issue. As a result, competition occurs between committees within
Congress and between policy actors appearing before committees, and policy issues
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are defined (and/or redefined) through this competitive process. I examine this
competitive process within the used nuclear fuel (UNF) subsystem, and the next
section provides a brief background on the UNF issue.3
1.4 Used Nuclear Fuel Management
Used nuclear fuel (UNF) 4 is the radioactive material that remains following the
production of nuclear energy. Nuclear energy currently provides about 20% of the
electricity used in the United States. To produce electricity, nuclear reactors make
use of the energy that is released through the process of nuclear fission—splitting
uranium atoms—in a controlled setting. The overall process of producing nuclear
energy—the nuclear fuel cycle—involves the mining, enrichment, and fabrication
of uranium into ceramic pellets. These pellets are placed within fuel rods that are
loaded into fuel assemblies and placed into the reactor. The fission process occurs
within each of these fuel rods. Once removed from the reactor, the fuel rods are
stored in large cooling pools and current practice is to store the rods on-site at
nuclear reactors. At a majority of sites the cooling pools have filled and the spent
fuel rods have been moved into large concrete casks. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) estimates that, as of 2009, nearly 63,000 metric tons of waste
exist at different sites around the country.5
What to do with the used nuclear material has been a difficult policy issue
for several decades. When nuclear energy was first developed, initial plans were to
reprocess this material. Reprocessing entails extracting material from the uranium
pellets in the fuel rods and using this material again. Due to concerns of nuclear
proliferation, reprocessing was halted by the Ford administration in 1976 (Walker,
3A more detailed discussion occurs in Chapter 3.
4Used nuclear material is known by various terms including nuclear waste, high-level waste,
spent nuclear fuel, and used nuclear fuel. I use the term used nuclear fuel (UNF).
5http://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/faqs.html
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2009). The ban on reprocessing was continued by the Carter administrated, but
was rescinded under Reagan. However, reprocessing has not been adopted in the
United States, likely due to the low-cost of uranium (Walker, 2009). Once repro-
cessing was abandoned, proper storage of this material became a central policy
question. Scientific consensus centered on deep geologic disposal as the preferred
storage medium, and Congress and the Carter administration begin working to
structure a process of site selection for two storage sites, one in the eastern half
of the United States and one in the western half (Carter, 1987). This culminated
in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 which stated that the Department of En-
ergy (DOE) shall characterize three sites as scientifically and technically feasible
to store the used nuclear material. The President would then choose one site from
the three, and the DOE would submit a license application to the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission (NRC) (Vandenbosch and Vandenbosch, 2007). This process was
short-circuited however, by the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987,
which designated Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the only site to be considered
for long-term storage. Yucca Mountain was approved by the Bush administration
in 2002, and the DOE submitted a license to the NRC in the summer of 2008.
In 2010, however the Obama administration withdrew the license application and
put in a place a Blue Ribbon Commission of experts to advise the administration
and Congress on next steps for dealing with civilian nuclear material. The BRC
submitted its report in early 2012.6
The issue of how to handle UNF provides an interesting case to examine how
information is transformed into issue definitions. I explore how this issue came to
be defined through the use of original data of all the Congressional hearings about
UNF from 1975 to 2012. I use quantitative text analysis to examine the opening
statements of each witness appearing at these hearings. These opening statements
6The BRC website can be found at brc.gov
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are used to determine the dimensions of the UNF policy debate. The next section
provides a brief overview of the following chapters of the dissertation.
1.5 Overview of the Dissertation
In brief, this dissertation can be summed up in four major points, which will be
explored in the following chapters:
• Issue definitions are a function of the weighting of the various dimensions of
the issue
• These salience weights can act as signals in an information processing frame-
work
• Dimensions vary in salience over time, and this variation is associated with
policy change
• Institutions and actors within policy subsystems vary in the attention they
pay (i.e., the signals they send) to the various dimensions
1.5.1 Chapter 2: Modeling Issue Definitions
Chapter 2 outlines the empirical approach used to estimate the dimensions of the
UNF issue. It describes, in detail, the data collection and analysis process. Data for
the dissertation comes from 1,271 witnesses statements from the 140 Congressional
hearings regarding UNF that occurred from 1975—2012. These statements were
analyzed using Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), a specific type of quantitative
text analysis. The LDA process uncovered seven dimensions of UNF policy; pro-
grammatic, safety/regulation, Yucca Mountain, site selection, science/technical,
storage, and transportation. These dimensions act as the dependent variables in
the subsequent chapters.
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1.5.2 Chapter 3: Policy Evolution and Issue Complexity
Policy change is often seen as the ultimate result of the policy process, even though
change is difficult to conceptualize and measure (Capano, 2009). The various
policy process frameworks and theories offer different drivers of policy change.
For example, PET argues that change occurs as a result of changed policy images
interacting with changed policy venues, and the ACF argues that change occurs as a
result of changed policy beliefs of the major policy actors involved in the subsystem.
In a similar fashion, it is possible that policy change occurs after an issue has
been redefined. However, it is also likely that policy change creates conditions for
issues to be redefined by altering the salient dimensions of an issue. In Chapter
3, I examine the dynamic nature of issue definitions and how those definitions
shape and are shaped by policy change. First, I detail the evolution of UNF
policy, and discuss the four major policy eras of UNF policy development. Next, I
posit hypotheses about which of the seven dimensions will be most salient within
each policy era. I test these hypotheses using a Bayesian Poisson changepoint
model, which examines shifts in salience for each of the dimensions. I then develop
hypotheses about policy evolution and issue complexity, and test these hypotheses
using the Herfindahl index.
1.5.3 Chapter 4: Institutions and Information
The theory of information processing argues that institutions process information
by organizing and prioritizing the signals (i.e., information) in the environment.
Individuals are “boundedly rational” and thereby limited in their ability to pro-
cess the multiple signals that exist with regard to one complex policy issue, let
alone the multiple issues and conditions that may require attention (Simon, 1997).
Institutions allow for such information to be processed in a parallel fashion, mean-
ing that many issues and many dimensions of issues can be processed simultane-
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ously. This parallel processing occurs through multiple policy subsystems and/or
through the multiple organizational layers of particular policymaking institutions.
For example, committees in Congress allow for specialization within certain policy
domains and this specialization allows committee to development expertise and
provide valuable information to the floor (Krehbiel, 1991). In addition to exper-
tise, parallel processing also implies variation in the jurisdictional boundaries of
Congressional committees. These two factors, expertise and jurisdictional scope,
combine to create the dynamics of expertise-based jurisdictional competition, in
which committees try to gain access to a subsystem by leveraging their expertise
on a salient dimension. Using the hearing data and the dimensions outlined in
Chapter 2, Chapter 4 develops and tests two hypotheses based on the assumption
of expertise based competition among committees.
1.5.4 Chapter 5: Policy Actors and Information
Apart from institutions, policy actors play a major role in defining policy issues.
Policy actors, such as executive agencies, elected officials, and interest groups,
are defined as individuals or groups with an interest, expertise, and sustained
involvement in policymaking. Many of these actors are motivated to participate
by interests, including but not limited to some material gain, and by core beliefs
and values (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Both
of these factors work to shape the policy preferences of the various actors involved
in the issue. In addition to being motivated, policy actors are also strategic. They
attempt to definition issues to in a way that they can “win” (Riker, 1986); defined
as achieving their particular policy goal. Given this desire to define issues on their
terms, policy actors will vary in the attention they pay to particular dimensions
of an issue. In Chapter 5, I posit a set of hypotheses about which dimensions the
policy actors active in the UNF subsystem will highlight in their Congressional
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testimony.
1.5.5 Chapter 6: Conclusion
In Chapter 6, I conclude by summarizing the findings and their implications and
discussing ideas for future research using the issue definition model.
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Chapter 2
Modeling Issue Definitions using Quantitative Text
Analysis
The issue definition model, outlined in Chapter 1, assumes that issue definitions
are comprised of the various dimensions of the issue weighted by the salience
of those dimensions. Determining the particular dimensions however, presents a
methodological challenge. This is because issues are often defined by debate and
argument, and determining the nature of debate requires reliable and valid ways
to measure “text as data.” The approach I adopt in this dissertation is topic
modeling, a type of quantitative text analysis. Specifically, I use Latent Dirichlet
Allocation (LDA) which is an “unsupervised” (i.e., requiring no prior coding of
documents) way to quantify the content of text documents. The text documents
I analyze are the verbal opening statements of 1,271 witnesses that appeared at
Congressional hearings about UNF between 1975 and 2012. Using this approach,
I discern seven dimensions within the UNF issue.
This chapter outlines the methodological approach taken to develop an em-
pirical estimate of the dimensions of the UNF issue, and to measure the salience
of those dimensions. The next section briefly describes text analysis broadly and
then offers a detailed discuss of LDA modeling. Following that, I examine the
dimensions that make up the UNF issue. Finally, I evaluate the validity of the
approach and the seven dimensions.
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2.1 Quantitative Text Analysis
The analysis of text data is a growing area of interest in political science and public
policy research. More scholars are moving toward quantitative methods to exam-
ine the growing amount of text data that is becoming widely available through
social media, “Big Data”, and the increasing digitization of historical documents
(Hopkins and King, 2010). Quantitative text analysis seeks to systematically cat-
egorize and draw inferences from texts. There are multiple ways and methods to
“quantify” text, and each approach contains strengths, weaknesses, and trade-offs
(Quinn et al., 2010). Broadly speaking, quantitative text analysis techniques are
used for either the classification or scaling of texts (Grimmer and Stewart, 2012).
Classification places text into one of several possible categories, and scaling lo-
cates actors in a policy space, typically along a liberal—conservative dimension.
My interest is in classification—specifically categorizing texts by issue dimension—
therefore I will focus on those techniques.1 The various classification techniques
include human coding, dictionary based approaches, supervised learning, and topic
modeling. In the next sections I briefly describe each approach before moving on
to a more in-depth discussion of Latent Dirichlet Allocation, the type of topic
modeling that I adopt to characterize the dimensions of the UNF issue.
2.1.1 Classification Techniques
Human Coding : Human coding approaches involve the hand-coding of documents
by multiple coders. In addition, categories are determined prior to the analysis and
are assumed to be unchanging. Coders then assign text to one of the categories,
often following a codebook developed prior to the analysis.2 For example, some
of the early work on the ACF used hand coded Congressional testimony to deter-
1For more on scaling see Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003); Lowe (2008); Lowe et al. (2011)
2Although the codebook can be adjusted in an iterative process during the analysis phase.
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mine the policy beliefs and coalition affiliations of policy actors (Jenkins-Smith,
Clair and Woods, 1991; Jenkins-Smith and Clair, 1993). In another example, the
Policy Agendas Project3 codes Congressional hearings, executive orders, State of
the Union speeches, Supreme Court cases, and other policy documents as being
about 1 of 19 major topics and 225 sub-topics. More recently, scholars have de-
veloped ways to discern the major elements of policy designs by coding policies
according to a rubric based on a Grammar of Institutions developed by Crawford
and Ostrom (1995) (these studies include Basurto et al., 2010; Siddiki et al., 2011;
Siddiki, Basurto and Weible, 2012). Human coding, particularly when multiple
coders are used, can be a valid and reliable approach to code texts. This is true,
in part, because multiple coders permit various reliability tests. However, they are
often cost prohibitive due to the resources needed to develop a codebook and to
train and pay coders. In addition, the categories, or the other item(s) to be coded,
need to be clearly defined and well understood by each coder. As a result of the
challenges inherent in human coding, several computer assisted approaches have
been developed. It should be noted that these approaches do not supplant careful
reading and understanding of the texts being studied, rather they augment and
enhance the ability of humans to classify a large volume of texts across multiple
categories.
Dictionaries : One automated approach is dictionary based classification. Dictio-
nary based coding uses dictionaries of keywords or phrases, that are developed
prior to the analysis, to classify documents by comparing the terms in the set of
documents to the terms in the dictionaries. One of the more popular dictionary
based approaches is sentiment analysis (Nasukawa and Yi, 2003; Hu and Liu, 2004;
Liu, Hu and Cheng, 2005; Liu, 2012). The dictionaries used for sentiment anal-
ysis are comprised of a set of words with positive connotation such as, “amaze”,
3http://www.policyagendas.org/
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“flexible”, “influential”, “low-risk”, and “sincere” or negative connotation such as,
“assault”, “dread”, “loath”, “malice”, and “unproven”. Sentiment analysis of this
type has been used to compare sentiment expressed through Twitter to consumer
confidence and presidential approval polls (OConnor et al., 2010) and the tone
of New York Times coverage across three policy domains, environment, foreign
affairs, and crime (Young and Soroka, 2012). The largest cost of dictionary based
approaches involves, much like human coding, the initial development of the dic-
tionary. While some publicly available dictionaries exist, particularly for sentiment
analysis, it is not clear that these dictionaries can be easily portable across differ-
ent contexts, therefore caution is needed when using these dictionaries (Grimmer
and Stewart, 2012).
Supervised Learning : Supervised learning combines human coding and automated
approaches. A subset of the texts are hand coded, typically placed into categories,
and then the remaining texts are categorized using a machine-learning algorithm
(Collingwood and Wilkerson, 2012). The hand coded texts constitutes the “train-
ing” data and the excluded texts are the “test” data. Often the idea behind this
approach is to get a sense of the overall proportion of documents that belong in
a particular category (Hopkins and King, 2010; Grimmer and King, 2011). This
approach has been used to categorize the activity of bureaucratic agencies into the
Policy Agendas coding scheme (Workman, 2009). There are a growing number of
software applications, based in the R statistical programming language, that use
this type of approach. These include ReadMe4 and RTextTools.5
Topic Modeling : While supervised learning methods require the use of some pre-
coded data, unsupervised methods, such as topic modeling, are fully automated
4http://gking.harvard.edu/readme
5http://www.rtexttools.com/
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approaches requiring no prior analysis or setting of categories. Probabilistic topic
models involve the automated processing of a large corpus of texts to determine
underlying latent themes or topics (Steyvers and Griffiths, 2007; Blei, 2012). In
short, “Topic modeling algorithms are statistical methods that analyze the words
of the original texts to discover the themes that run through them, how those
themes are connected to each other, and how they change over time” (Blei, 2012,
77-78). Topic modeling has been used to examine Senate press releases (Grimmer,
2010) and floor speeches in Congress (Quinn et al., 2010). The approach I adopt
in this dissertation is Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) modeling, which is a type
of topic model. LDA is explained in detail in the next section.
2.1.2 Latent Dirichlet Allocation
The issue definition model posits that issue are defined by the dimensions of the
policy issue weighted by the salience of those dimensions. In order to empirically
determine the issue dimensions, I use LDA. The core assumption of LDA is that
a single document can contain multiple latent topics (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2003),
where a topic is determined by the co-occurrence of words (Blei, 2012). Therefore,
LDA models are an ideal modeling approach for the issue definition model given
that it is important to be able to assume that policy issues exist in a multidimen-
sional space and that policy actors will touch on more than a single dimension in
their testimony before Congress. In brief, LDA assumes a hierarchical structure
where a corpus is a collection of documents, documents are a collection of topics,
and topics are a collection of words (Steyvers and Griffiths, 2007). As such, LDA
models are structured hierarchically as;
Corpus → Documents → Topics → Words
Similarly, the issue definition model to be estimated using Congressional testimony,
where the documents are statements and the topics are dimensions, is structured
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as;
Statements → Dimensions → Words
An additional assumption of LDA is that the documents and the words are ob-
served, but a latent, or hidden, structure of topics, topic distributions per docu-
ments, and word distributions per topic exists. Therefore, LDA can be thought
of as a dimension reduction approach where multiple words are placed within a
few latent topics. The model estimates words within topics and topics within
documents simultaneously, with the goal of inferring the latent structure of topic
proportions within documents. In more formal terms, LDA is a generative model
based on observed variables (words) and hidden variables (topics) that defines a
joint probability distribution. The joint probability distribution is then used to
calculate, though Bayes’ rule, a conditional or posterior distribution of the hidden
variables given the observed variables (Blei, 2012, 79-80).
Using formal notation adopted from Blei, Ng and Jordan (2003), a word is
denoted w, and a document is a collection of N words, w = (w1, w2, ..., wn), where
wn is the nth word in the document. Note the word ordering is not important and
that LDA assumes a “bag of words” approach, where co-occurrences of terms and
not the order of terms are used to determine underlying topics. Finally, a corpus
is a collection of M documents denoted D = (w1,w2, ...,wM). Following this
notation, the generative process, that is the assumed process that generated the
documents, topics, and words, can be described as follows (Blei, Ng and Jordan,
2003, 996):
1. Choose N ∼ Poisson(ξ)
2. Choose θ ∼ Dir(α)
3. For each of the N words wn
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(a) Choose a topic zn ∼ Multinomial(θ)
(b) Choose a word wn from p(wn|zn, β), a multinomial probability condi-
tioned on the topic zn.
Topic proportions, denoted θ, are the sum of the probabilities for each topic in
the dth document. These proportions are assumed to be drawn from a Dirichlet
prior, θ ∼ Dir(α) where α is the Dirichlet distribution’s shape parameters. The
number of topics K, and by extension the dimensionality of Dir(α) and the topic
variable z, is assumed a priori and is also assumed as fixed. The Dirichlet prior
of α is 50/K (Griffiths and Steyvers, 2004). Finally, the distribution of words is
parameterized by β.
As noted, the observed and latent variables form a joint distribution that given
the parameters α and β, topic mixture θ, a set of N topics z, and a set of N words
w can be expressed as:
p(θ, z,w|α, β) = p(θ|α)
N∏
n=1
p(zn|θ)p(wn|zn, β)
This joint distribution is used to calculate a posterior distribution of topic
probabilities for each document, expressed as:
p(θ, z|w, α, β) = p(θ, z,w|α, β)
p(w|α, β)
The numerator is the joint distribution of all random variables, and the denomi-
nator is the probability of obtaining the observed corpus under any topic model
(Blei, 2012, 81). These probabilities could be summed over all possible topic
structures, however given the large number of possible topic structures this be-
comes “intractable to compute” (Blei, 2012, 81). Therefore, this total needs to
be approximated using either sampling based or variational approximations (Blei,
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2012). I use Gibbs sampling to estimate the posterior distribution (Griffiths and
Steyvers, 2004).
In less formal terms, LDA is a data reduction technique (e.g., factor analysis)
that assumes that a text document has a mixture of latent topics. Words that
co-occur repeatedly across documents are assigned to a topic. Then, based on the
array of words in a document, LDA estimates the proportion of each document
that refers to each topic. The next section describes the data collection process,
and the topics present during Congressional hearings with regard to UNF.
2.2 Defining Used Nuclear Fuel
Data for the analysis came from 140 Congressional hearings, drawn from the Con-
gressional Universe database about used nuclear fuel between the years 1975 and
2012. The hearings were found using the search terms “nuclear waste”, “spent nu-
clear fuel”, “used nuclear fuel”, and “Yucca Mountain.” The hearings were coded
by Congress, year, chamber, committee, sub-committee, witnesses, and witness
affiliation.6 Hearing transcripts, in PDF format, were available for each hear-
ing. Overall, these hearings included a total of 1,322 witnesses, of which 1,271
gave opening statements and the remainder were either silent or only answered
questions. More details about the witnesses will be discussed in Chapter 5. The
verbal opening statements of each of these witnesses were extracted from the hear-
ing transcript, each statement became a separate document, and these documents
were combined into a corpus.7 The next section describes the analysis and results.
6Appropriation hearings were excluded from the subsequent analysis because participation in
those hearings is limited, therefore they are not considered representative of overall participation.
7Some previous work has coded the written statements of witnesses (e.g., Esterling, 2011),
however I chose to use the verbal statements because witnesses, do to time constraints, are
likely to express the most salient points in the verbal statement. In addition, only the opening
statements were used and not the question and answer portions of the hearings, so that only
those dimensions that the witness thought salient, and not the questioner, would be determined.
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2.2.1 Document Preprocessing
Prior to modeling, the text documents require some preprocessing. The first steps
involved removing numbers and punctuation and placing terms in lowercase. The
next step was to remove all standard stop-words (e.g., and, for, in, is, it, the) from
the corpus. An additional number of stop-words unique to the policy issue (e.g.,
nuclear, waste, spent, fuel) and unique to the context of Congressional hearings
(e.g., chairman, committee, thank, testimony) were also removed. These stop-
words are removed because they are common to nearly every witness and therefore
provide no valuable information.8 While it is important to remove words that are
extremely common, it is just as important to remove words that are rarely used,
or used by only a few witnesses. This is important because rarely used words are
not likely to be associated with any topic, thereby introducing unwanted noise
into the model. Thus, I removed all terms that were not in at least 1% of the
documents. Next, I use the Porter algorithm (Porter, 1980) to stem the remaining
terms. Stemming refers to the process of removing the suffix of terms to equate
similar terms while reducing the overall number of terms. For example, the stem
word decis stands for decision or decisions. Finally, I created a document-term
matrix where rows represent the documents, the columns represent the terms, and
the cells contain the number of times each term appears in each document. This
matrix contained the 1,271 documents as the rows and the 2,941 terms.9
2.2.2 Model Selection
There are not, as of yet, agreed upon quantitative measures to asses or compare the
model fit of topic models (Blei, 2012). Compared to supervised approaches where
the onus is on the researcher to develop categories prior to analysis, unsupervised
8This is standard practice when doing this type of text analysis (see Grimmer, 2010; Quinn
et al., 2010).
9For more detail on the steps discussed above see Feinerer, Hornik and Meyer (2008).
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approaches, such as topic models, place the burden on the researcher to ensure
that the categories derived by the model have semantic validity (Quinn et al.,
2010; Grimmer and Stewart, 2012). Semantic validity means that each topic has
a clear and coherent meaning that can be discerned by the association of terms
to that topic (Krippendorff, 2003). Since the K number of topics are assumed
prior to modeling, which is a common feature of cluster algorithms (Grimmer and
King, 2011), care must be taken when assigning the number of topics. Given this,
I used an iterative process of modeling with varying topic numbers including 2,
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 20, 50, and 100. The criteria used to evaluate the results of
models using different numbers of topics were largely substantive and conceptual
(much like Quinn et al., 2010, 216).10 The ideal number of topics should have
semantic validity and represent dimensions that are likely to exist throughout
the time period being examined. With K ≤ 6 several terms overlapped making
topics less clearly differentiated, and K ≥ 8 I judged the topics to be too narrow
and time-bound. Given these results seven topics were chosen as the best fitting
number of dimensions. The next section describes the dimensions of the UNF issue.
Following that I examine the predictive validity—“the extent to which the measure
corresponds correctly to external events” (Quinn et al., 2010, 216)—by predicting
the mean proportion of each dimension following two major policy changes; the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 and the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act
of 1987.
2.2.3 Used Nuclear Fuel Dimensions
To determine the distribution of dimensions at Congressional hearings regarding
used nuclear fuel, I used LDA on the opening statements of witnesses appearing
10As noted, automated techniques augments human understanding and does not replace it.
Therefore, the importance of substantive knowledge about the policy area begin examined cannot
be overstated.
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at those hearings. Opening statements were collected and preprocessed into a
1,271 X 2,941 document-term matrix. The rows of this matrix represent the 1,271
opening statements, the columns represent the 2,941 unique terms, and the cells
are the count of terms per document. As noted, LDA assumes a proportion per
document of latent topics based on the distribution of terms, where terms that
co-occur frequently are understood as belonging to the same topic. The observed
data (terms) are used to estimate the unobserved topics. In other words, the model
finds the parameters α and β that maximize the log-likelihood of the data in the
1,271 X 2,941 matrix (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2003). For my purposes, topics are
assumed to be synonymous with issue dimensions. The results of the LDA process
are shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 lists the 30 terms that were most closely associated with each dimen-
sion.11 As is evident in Table 2.1, terms tended to cluster into seven discernible
dimensions; programmatic, safety/regulation, Yucca Mountain, site selection, sci-
entific/technical, storage, and transportation. Below I briefly describe each of the
seven dimensions.
Programmatic: The programmatic dimension deals largely with the de-
velopment and implementation of programs related to the selection and
characterization of a suitable site for waste disposal. This is evidenced
by terms such as “site”, “program”, “review”, “plan”, and “process.”
Safety/Regulation: The safety/regulation dimension deals with the de-
velopment and implementation of proper regulatory standards for deal-
ing with used nuclear fuel. This can be seen by the importance of such
terms as “radioact”, “dispos”, “standard”, and “manag.”
Yucca Mountain: This dimension deals with Yucca Mountain in Nevada,
the site ultimately chosen for disposal, as evidenced by terms such as
11Note that a term can be associated with more than one topic.
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Table 2.1: Dimensions of Used Nuclear Fuel and the Terms Most Associated with
each Dimension
Dimensions Terms
Programmatic site, program, DOE, repositori, act, process, re-
view, plan, licens, NRC, polici, issu, public, char-
acter, decis, propos, provid, recommend, technic,
requir, commiss, depart, concern, comment, de-
velop, environment, particip, final, manag, feder
Safety/Regulation radioact, dispos, highlevel, EPA, environment,
standard, lowlevel, develop, materi, program,
manag, radiat, protect, level, oper, dump, re-
search, public, erda, contain, ocean, product, ura-
nium, futur, intern, agenc, activ, unit, regul, requir
Yucca Mountain DOE, program, mountain, yucca, fund, nevada,
project, repositori, depart, issu, energi, cost,
board, continu, billion, scientif, act, report, court,
site, current, million, util, begin, secretari, applic,
nation, polici, manag, meet
Site Selection site, nation, senat, energi, time, process, concern,
polit, feel, depart, repres, hear, bill, tri, countri,
legisl, governor, issu, nevada, citizen, reason, land,
simpli, decis, happen, suggest, hope, govern, seri-
ous, talk
Scientific/Technical repositiori, site, geolog, studi, test, time, data, sys-
tem, technic, develop, water, salt, dispos, evalu,
design, potenti, rock, form, isol, requir, program,
perform, activ, investig, result, process, environ,
concept, research, suitabl
Storage storag, facil, reactor, manag, dispos, feder, power,
plant, oper, reprocess, util, govern, energi, cost, in-
terim, provid, industri, commerci, perman, capac,
polici, develop, licens, nation, technolog, electr,
time, generat, store, administr
Transportation transport, materi, local, shipment, respons, safeti,
regul, feder, radioact, citi, cask, counti, hazard, ac-
cid, public, health, rout, govern, risk, depart, nrc,
requir, communiti, york, ship, propos, concern, im-
pact, emerg, involv
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“mountain”, “yucca”, and “nevada.”
Site Selection: Site selection is largely about the politics surrounding
the process of choosing possible site locations to store used nuclear fuel.
Important terms include “site”, “nation”, “concern”, and “polit.” The
term polit is the stem for terms like politics and political.
Scientific/Technical : The scientific/technical dimension deals with the
science of used fuel storage (e.g., “studi”, “test”, “data”) and the type
of natural medium that could be used “salt”, “geolog”, “rock” for stor-
age.
Storage: This dimension deals with questions about storage (e.g., “storag”)
and waste management, but largely centers on concerns about on-site
storage at nuclear power plants vs. off-site storage of waste. This is
evidenced by terms like “facil”, “reactor”, “capac.”
Transportation: The transportation dimensions deals with transporta-
tion of spent nuclear fuel from production site to storage site (e.g.,
“transport”, “shipment”, “rout”).
Table 2.2 provides descriptive statistics for each dimension. As noted, each
opening statement has an estimated topic proportion for each of the seven dimen-
sions, and Table 2.2 displays the overall mean, standard deviation, and minimum
and maximum values for each dimension.
The programmatic dimension has a mean of 0.20, which indicates that the
average proportion of the programmatic dimension across all the statements is 0.20.
The programmatic dimension also has the highest mean, which indicates that it was
the most salient (i.e., most talked about) dimension over the full span of hearings.
Site selection had the next highest mean at 0.17, followed by Yucca Mountain and
storage at 0.14, then science/technical at 0.13, and finally safety/regulation and
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics of Dimensions
Dimension Mean sd Min Max
Programmatic 0.20 0.15 0.01 0.80
Safety/Regulation 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.75
Yucca Mountain 0.14 0.12 0.01 0.74
Site Selection 0.17 0.12 0.01 0.59
Science/Technical 0.13 0.11 0.01 0.82
Storage 0.14 0.12 0.01 0.71
Transportation 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.74
transportation each had a mean proportion of 0.11. However, the high standard
deviations of each dimension indicate a sizable amount of variation around the
mean. This is also seen in the min and max values that range from 0.01 to 0.82.
A min value of 0.01, which is near zero, indicates that the dimension was not
discussed much in at least one statement and a higher max value, such as 0.82,
means that an estimated 82% of at least one statement was about that particular
dimension. The dimension with the lowest max value was site selection at 0.59,
whereas the dimension with the highest was scientific and technical at 0.82. Site
selection had the lowest “peak” proportion (0.59) but the second highest mean
proportion (0.17), indicating that this issue dimension was rarely the sole topic
addressed by any particular witness, but was frequently discussed in tandem with
other dimensions.
Table 2.3 show the correlations between each dimension. As shown, the strongest
correlation is -0.29 between the safety/regulation dimension and the Yucca Moun-
tain dimension.12 This is likely a result of the fact that, as shown in Figure 2.1 and
will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, the safety/regulation dimension
was more salient in the early phase of the UNF subsystem and the Yucca Mountain
dimension was more salient in the later phases.
12If there was a strong correlation between the dimensions, than a Correlated Topic Model
(CTM) would have been more appropriate. However, using a CTM produced very similar results.
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Table 2.3: Correlations of Dimensions
Program Safe Yucca Site Sci/Tech Storage Trans
Program 1.00 -0.27 -0.15 -0.26 -0.10 -0.26 -0.26
Safe -0.27 1.00 -0.29 -0.20 0.09 -0.05 -0.12
Yucca -0.15 -0.29 1.00 -0.07 -0.22 -0.07 -0.16
Site -0.26 -0.20 -0.07 1.00 -0.19 -0.20 -0.03
Sci/Tech -0.10 0.09 -0.22 -0.19 1.00 -0.21 -0.24
Storage -0.26 -0.05 -0.07 -0.20 -0.21 1.00 -0.18
Trans -0.26 -0.12 -0.16 -0.03 -0.24 -0.18 1.00
Figure 2.1 shows how the proportion of attention paid to the different dimen-
sions tended to vary over the period from 1975-2012. The panels within Figure
2.1 show a scatterplot of the proportion of each dimension for each statement by
Congress. Each scatterplot contains a lowess line, a non-parametric measure of
fit, for each dimension showing a non-linear characterization of the proportion of
discussion devoted to that dimension over time.
As can be seen, the dimensions vary over time in their salience by Congress.
The programmatic dimension seems to have risen for each Congress and peaked
around the 99th Congress, or around 1985-1986. This is as expected given that is
it the period after the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982 and just prior
to the Amendments Act of 1987 (NWPAA), which designated Yucca Mountain as
the only site to be considered. The safety/regulation dimension was more salient
in earlier Congresses as opposed to later years, because this was when Congress
was first examining how to deal with used nuclear fuel. Yucca Mountain became
increasing salient following the NWPAA, over which period the Yucca site was the
focus of UNF disposal policy. Site selection seems to have been most prominent
following the 97th Congress, which passed the NWPA, and then starts to slowly
taper off. The science and technical dimension seems to have remained relatively
flat, however it seems to have much more variation in the earlier Congresses than in
later ones. The storage dimension seems to have declined from the 94th Congress
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Figure 2.1: Dimension Proportions by Congress
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Transportation
until rising again after the 100th and then staying at that level. Finally, trans-
portation seems to have remained relatively flat over the entire period, although
with periods of more variability.
Overall, the salience of each dimension seems to rise and fall as we would ex-
pect given the policy developments occurring within the various Congresses. This
pattern of variation within dimensions provides some evidence for the validity of
these dimensions, suggesting that they capture the nature of the debate concerning
UNF policy over the 1975-2012 period. The next section more closely examines
the validity of the dimensions by using OLS to model the dimensions following
two major exogenous events; the passage of the NWPA and the passage of the
NWPAA.
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2.2.4 Predictive Validity Check
Predictive validity refers to whether the measure(s) correspond with exogenous
events as we would expect. Quinn et al. (2010) found that their categorization of
Congressional floor speeches matched with important events in expected ways. For
example, speeches about national defense and the use of force increased in 1999
during the bombing of Kosovo, in 2001 following September 11th and the lead-up
to the war in Afghanistan, and most notably in 2002 during the lead-up to the
war in Iraq. Along a similar line, I examine the impact of two major pieces of
legislation on the salience of each of the dimensions.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) was the first major piece of
legislation that dealt directly with used nuclear fuel. Among its provisions, it
required the Department of Energy (DOE) to study five potential sites and recom-
mend three to the President by 1985; allowed a veto for the potential host state,
however this veto could be overridden by Congress; and established away-from-
reactor storage once storage capacity at a plant site had been met (CQ Almanac,
1982). The second major piece of legislation, the Nuclear Waste Policy Amend-
ments Act of 1987 (NWPAA), designated Yucca Mountain in Nevada, as the only
site to considered for a used nuclear fuel repository.
Knowing a little bit about these major policy changes and about the dimen-
sions, we can derive some expectations about the behavior of the dimensions fol-
lowing each major change. For example, we expect that the salience of the pro-
grammatic dimension would increase following the NWPA, since the programmatic
dimension is largely focused on the development and implementation of the pro-
grams that are called for in the NWPA. We would also expect that site selection
would become more salient after the passage of NWPA, since that legislation initi-
ated the process of studying various potential sites. Finally, we would expect that
the Yucca Mountain dimension would become more salient after the passage of the
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NWPAA.
To examine these salience changes, I used OLS to model the salience of each
dimension following each of the two major policy changes.13 The dependent vari-
able is the mean proportion for the predicted dimension aggregated by year. This
gives an N of 38, for the 38 years in the dataset (1975-2012). The two independent
variables are dummy variables that represent the two policy changes. The NWPA
variable has a value of 0 for 1975 to 1981 and 1987 to 2012, and a value of 1 for
1982 to 1986. The NWPA was superseded by the NWPAA, which is why it has
zero values from 1987 to 2012. The NWPAA variable has a value of 0 for 1975 to
1986 and a value of 1 for 1987 to 2012. Table 2.4 presents the results.
Table 2.4: Salience of the Dimensions following Policy Change
Program Safety Yucca Site Sci/Tech Storage Trans
(Intercept) 0.18∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
NWPA 0.11∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ 0.04 0.08∗ −0.00 −0.12∗ 0.00
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04)
NWPAA −0.04 −0.11∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.05∗∗ −0.03 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
adj. R2 0.36 0.46 0.55 0.15 0.25 0.10 −0.05
Resid. sd 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.07
Standard errors in parentheses
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
As shown in Table 2.4, the programmatic dimension, as expected, became more
salient following the passage of the NWPA, but showed no significant change fol-
lowing the NWPAA. The safety/regulation dimension became less salient following
each major change. This may be because questions of the proper safeguards of this
material were technical questions that were addressed early in the process. Also as
expected, the Yucca Mountain dimension became significantly more salient follow-
ing the NWPAA. The site selection dimension, as expected, became more salient
following the NWPA. The scientific and technical dimension became less salient
13The focus here is only to see if some evidence of validity of the dimension measures can be
gained by examining their relationship with two major pieces of legislation. In the next chapter,
Chapter 3, I will use more sophisticated time series techniques and examine the relationship
between the dimensions and policy change in much more depth.
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following the NWPAA, perhaps because the focused shifted to Yucca Mountain and
away from broader technical questions. The storage dimension declined following
the NWPA, likely because the NWPA settled the question of away-from-reactor
storage. Although, away-from-reactor storage remains a highly controversial aspect
of the used nuclear fuel debate. Finally, neither policy change had any significant
impact on the transportation dimension. Overall, the dimension measures seemed
to perform as expected, with a priori expectations about the programmatic, site
selection, and Yucca Mountain dimensions being met and the other dimensions
performing in ways that quite plausible given the history of the UNF debate.
Summary
This chapter set out to empirically measure the dimensions of the used nuclear
fuel issue. This is the first step toward measuring the the issue definition model
presented in Chapter 1. One of the major challenges of measuring issue dimensions
is that they are often expressed in oral and/or written debates, thereby making
empirical measurement more difficult. However, scholars have developed a number
of approaches to quantify texts, and this chapter surveyed the options before set-
tling on Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) as the appropriate modeling approach.
Following a detailed discussion of LDA, I briefly described the seven dimensions of
used nuclear fuel management that I discerned using LDA. These dimensions were
then determined to have both semantic validity, having a coherent meaning that
was evident by the clustering of terms, and predictive validity by corresponding
with external events as expected. The next three chapters of this dissertation will
use these measures to determine the role of policy change, institutions, and actors
in determining how issues are defined.
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Chapter 3
Policy Evolution, Complexity, and Issue Definitions
Policy change is of major importance to policy scholars. Indeed, much of the work
on policy process theories is geared toward explaining the necessary conditions
and processes required for policy change to occur. One of the conditions often
considered necessary for policy change are external shocks coming from outside
the subsystem. These shocks include “changes in socioeconomic conditions, regime
change, outputs from other subsystems, or disaster” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007,
198-199), and they can shift coalitions, open policy windows, and compel punctu-
ations. Other possible avenues are those that are internal to the subsystem such
as policy-oriented learning, shifts in policy images, changing policy venues, and
shifts in attention to different dimensions of the issue (Baumgartner and Jones,
1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Jones, 1994a; Jones and Baumgartner,
2005). In this chapter I focus on how shifts in attention (i.e., shifts in salience)
across issue dimensions is related to policy change over a period of nearly four
decades. I also examine the complexity—the number of dimensions of an issue un-
der consideration—of UNF management and how it varies following major policy
change.
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3.1 Policy Change and Policy Evolution
The study of long term policy change requires a time horizon of at least ten years
(Sabatier and Weible, 2007). In this chapter I examine, what I term, the policy
evolution of the UNF issue. For purposes of this chapter, policy evolution is
defined simply as policy change over time. I examine changes in the UNF issue
over a period of 38 years, from 1978 to 2012, and this period covers two major
policy changes; the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 and the Nuclear Waste
Policy Amendments Act of 1987.
Policy change is often associated with shifts in the salience of the dimensions
underlying the policy issue space, and this association extends to policy evolution.
However, these linkages are dynamic, meaning that salience shifts are a cause
and effect of policy change. In other words, policy change can occur because
one or more dimensions became more salient, yet policy change itself can shift the
salience of the underlying issue dimensions. To examine these relationships, I begin
by providing a brief background on the UNF subsystem. Once this background
is established, and coupled with the dimensions discussed in Chapter 2, I derive
hypotheses about which dimensions will be more salient prior to major policy
change and which will be more salient following major policy change. To test
these hypotheses, I use a Bayesian changepoint model that estimates both the
points in time and the number of salience shifts for each dimension.
Policy evolution is closely related to shifts in dimension salience, and it may
also be related to the complexity of the issue. Many (perhaps most) policy issues
are multidimensional, and this dimensionality increases the complexity of the issue.
A large body of work argues that political institutions help structure complex and
multidimensional issues into a single dimension (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal, 1997).
For example, Talbert and Potoski (2002) and Jones, Talbert and Potoski (2003)
argue that when bills are introduced in Congress they contain multiple dimensions,
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but these dimensions are reduced by the time the bill is voted on by the entire
chamber. This reduction in complexity from bill introduction to floor vote follows
a period of debate and committee consideration. The debate and information gath-
ering that occurs through the committee process works to reduce the number of
salient dimensions, thereby reducing the complexity of the issue. Conversely how-
ever, the debate and consideration process may increase complexity by producing
more information about the policy issue under consideration (Jones, Baumgartner
and de la Mare, 2005; Breunig and Workman, 2010). In addition, other work has
noted that when issues are multidimensional it can allow strategic policy actors to
alter the issue space by adding dimensions that are salient to them (Riker, 1986,
1990). This sets up competing hypotheses about the nature of policy evolution
and issue complexity. On the one hand, policy evolution may work to decrease
complexity by reducing the number of salient dimensions. This reduction occurs
because following policy change some dimensions could be considered “settled”,
no longer controversial, and therefore no longer salient. However, on the other
hand, policy evolution can increase complexity by highlighting different dimen-
sions and/or allowing policy actors needed time to reframe the issue. I examine
these hypotheses using the Herfindahl index, which measures the concentration of
issue dimensions. Specifically, I compare values of the Herfindahl index across the
four major “eras” of UNF policy evolution; prior to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
of 1982 (NWPA), after the NWPA, after the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments
Act of 1987 (NWPAA), and after the withdrawal of the Yucca Mountain license
application. The next section provides background on the development of the UNF
subsystem and each of these eras.
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3.2 The Development of the Used Nuclear Fuel Subsystem
Policy subsystems have been the major unit of analysis for scholars of the policy
process (see McCool, 1998, for a review). Subsystems are the foci of policymak-
ing activity and they include the relevant Congressional committees, bureaucratic
institutions, interest groups, and other interested policy actors. In addition, sub-
systems are seen as semi-independent or semi-autonomous from the larger political
environment. Indeed, the dominant actors within in the subsystem often work to
exclude participation of other actors and venues (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993,
2002). However, the delineation of subsystems can be difficult in practice. This
delineation is further complicated by nested or overlapping subsystems (Sabatier
and Weible, 2007), and policy issues, like climate change or national security, that
span multiple subsystems. As a result, a growing body of work is moving beyond
the subsystem as the unit of analysis and examining trans-subsystem dynamics
(Jones and Jenkins-Smith, 2009) and policy regimes. A policy regime is focused
on “boundary-spanning” policy issues with institutional features that are shared
across multiple subsystems (Jochim and May, 2010; May, Jochim and Sapotichne,
2011). For analytical clarity, I treat UNF management as its own distinct subsys-
tem, however it is clearly nested within the larger nuclear energy policy regime.
UNF management initially evolved as a dimension of the nuclear energy subsys-
tem, however UNF begin to development as a distinct policy issue following several
changes in the nuclear energy subsystem. In the 1940s and 1950s the nuclear en-
ergy subsystem was the quintessential iron triangle with a dominant coalition of
energy companies, members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in Congress
(JCAE), and bureaucrats within the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) (Baum-
gartner and Jones, 1993; Duffy, 1997). Baumgartner and Jones (1993), argue that
the disruption of the nuclear energy subsystem, that began in the 1960s and fol-
lowed through the 1970s, was precipitated by the interaction of policy images and
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political institutions. As the policy image of nuclear energy began to shift, from
positive to negative, opponents of nuclear energy were able to successfully apply
pressure to other policy institutions (e.g., various congressional committees, the
courts) to claim jurisdiction on elements of nuclear energy. The claiming of ju-
risdiction by multiple institutions, split the previously dominant coalition. While
no single event marks the demise of the nuclear energy subsystem, major change
was initiated with the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA). The ERA split
the AEC into the Energy Research and Development Administration (later the
Department of Energy) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). These
shifting dynamics also weakened the once powerful JCAE, and it was disbanded
in 1977. These two changes altered the institutional foundation of the nuclear
energy subsystem, and laid the groundwork for the development of a distinct UNF
subsystem. The next section provides a brief history of the development of UNF
policy in Congress.
3.2.1 The Policy Evolution of Used Nuclear Fuel Manage-
ment
The shifting policy images of nuclear energy and changing institutional foundations
of the nuclear energy subsystem set the stage for UNF management to emerge as its
own issue with distinct attributes or dimensions. Using Congressional testimony,
Chapter 2 outlined the seven dimensions of UNF policy and below I describe the
evolution of the UNF subsystem, including major events and legislation associated
with UNF. Table 3.1 outlines four policy eras, based on the policy evolution of used
nuclear materials management. Specifically, these periods are delineated by the
three major UNF policy changes. The first era includes the years prior the passage
of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) (1975-1982), the second era includes
the years following the NWPA but before the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments
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Act (NWPAA) (1983-1987), the third era includes the years following the NWPAA
(1988-2009), and the fourth era are the years following the withdrawal of the Yucca
Mountain license application (2010-). In addition, Table 3.1 also presents the
significant legislative and/or executive actions that occurred during those periods.
Following Table 3.1, I briefly describe each of the four eras.
Table 3.1: Development of Used Nuclear Fuel Policy
Policy Eras (Years) Events
Pre-NWPA (1975-1982)
JCAE Abolished (1977)
Interagency Review Group (1978)
Nuclear Waste Policy Act (1982)
Post-NWPA (1983-1987)
DOE formally recommends three sites for con-
sideration; one each in Washington, Texas, and
Nevada (1986)
Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act (1987)
Yucca Mountain (1988-2009)
Energy Policy Act (1992)
Clinton Veto of Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
2000 (2000)
Yucca Mountain Approval (2002)
License Submitted (2008)
Post-Yucca Mountain (2010- )
License Withdrawn (2010)
Blue Ribbon Commission (2012)
Legislation in italics
Pre-Nuclear Waste Policy Act (1975-1982)
In this early period, the management of UNF was not considered to be consequen-
tial in the development of civilian nuclear energy (Walker, 2009). During the early
phases of nuclear energy development it was planned that UNF would be repro-
cessed to recover uranium and plutonium and these recovered materials could then
be used to produce fresh nuclear fuel for the production of more energy. However,
some highly radioactive material remains even after reprocessing, but the safe dis-
posal of those remains were considered at the time to be a “solvable problem”
(Walker, 2009). In the mid 1950’s the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) is-
sued a report that recommended deep geologic disposal of used nuclear materials
43
(Vandenbosch and Vandenbosch, 2007). In particular, the NAS recommended salt
as the geologic medium for disposal. Following this recommendation, the Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC) began to examine possible sites for the permanent dis-
posal of nuclear materials. One site that was considered in the early 1970’s was
the salt deposits near Lyons, Kansas. However, this site was abandoned due to
scientific and technical concerns over the impact of boreholes, created when ex-
ploring for oil and gas, on the structural integrity of the site. In addition, there
were political concerns expressed by state and local officials in Kansas (for more
on the Lyons case see Carter, 1987; Vandenbosch and Vandenbosch, 2007; Walker,
2009).
As noted, in the early phases of nuclear energy development it was planned
that nuclear fuel would be reprocessed and the recovered uranium and plutonium
would be used as an additional source of fuel. However, due to nuclear prolifer-
ation concerns—the plutonium that resulted from reprocessing could be used to
make nuclear weapons—reprocessing was officially abandoned by the Ford admin-
istration in 1976. This policy was carried forward by President Carter, and was
reversed by President Reagan. Even though Reagan eliminated the ban on repro-
cessing, commercial reprocessing of UNF has not yet become viable due to the low
price of uranium relative to the cost of developing reprocessing technology (CQ
Researcher, 2011). Following the abandonment of reprocessing, the management
of used nuclear material became less of a “solvable problem.”
In 1978 the Carter administration formed an Interagency working group to
examine the scientific and technical issues surrounding the management of UNF.
This working group released a report in 1979 that concluded:
• The responsibility for resolving military and civilian waste man-
agement problems should not be deferred to future generations.
• The most promising technology for permanent disposal of high-
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level nuclear waste is geologic disposal.
• The search for repository sites should consider a number of loca-
tions in a variety of geologic environments leading to the option
of having at least two repositories, preferably in different regions
of the country.
• Interim storage should not be a substitute for progress on opening
the first repositories
(Vandenbosch and Vandenbosch, 2007, 53)
The recommendation that multiple geologic media, apart from salt as recom-
mended by the NAS in the 1950s, be considered opened up possibilities for many
other sites. Following the working group’s report, several pieces of UNF man-
agement legislation were introduced in the 96th and 97th Congresses based on
the report, proposals by the Carter administration, and work done by the Senate
Energy Committee. Legislation passed both the House and Senate in the 96th
Congress, but the conference committee was unable to reconcile the bills. How-
ever, the 97th Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and it was signed
into law by President Reagan in January 1983 (CQ Almanac, 1982).
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA): The NWPA was the
first piece of legislation that dealt specifically with the management of
UNF, and outlined the role the federal government would play in UNF
management. It established the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste
Management (OCRWM) within the Department of Energy (DOE). The
NWPA adopted geological disposal as the preferred type of disposal,
but it also allowed Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) to be con-
sidered as an option. It required the DOE to nominate five sites for
consideration as appropriate for geological storage and required the
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Secretary of Energy to recommend one site to the President. It stated
that the Department of Energy (DOE) must receive a license from
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for both the construction
of the repository and for the receipt of UNF. This licensing process
mirrored the process of a utility obtaining a license for a nuclear power
plant. The NWPA also limited the quantity of waste to be placed in the
repository to 70,000 metric tons. It also allowed for a second repository
to be built, presumably, in the eastern U.S. Once a site was chosen, the
potential host state was allowed to veto the facility, however this veto
could be overridden by Congress. The NWPA set a deadline of 1998 for
the DOE to take possession of UNF. Finally, it established the Nuclear
Waste Fund to pay the cost of UNF storage. The fund collects money
by placing a fee of 0.1 cents per kilowatt hour on consumers of nuclear
energy (CQ Almanac, 1982; Carter, 1987; Clary, 1991; Vandenbosch
and Vandenbosch, 2007; Walker, 2009).
Post-Nuclear Waste Policy Act (1983-1987)
The NWPA compelled the DOE to characterize five possible sites for the disposal
of UNF. Five sites were proposed in late 1984, and they were located in Hanford,
Washington; Yucca Mountain, Nevada; Deaf Smith County, Texas; Davis Canyon,
Utah; and Richton Dome, Mississippi. The evaluation of these sites lead the DOE,
in their Draft Environmental Assessments, to rank (in alphabetical order) Deaf
Smith, Hanford, and Yucca Mountain as the top three choices (Vandenbosch and
Vandenbosch, 2007, 62-63). However, in 1986 the DOE released a “Multi-Attribute
Utility Analysis” that ranked (in order) Yucca Mountain, Richton Dome, Davis
Canyon, and Hanford as the preferred sites based on “minimizing health and safety
impacts, and construction, and transportation costs” (Vandenbosch and Vanden-
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bosch, 2007, 63). Based on these reports, in 1986 the DOE limited consideration
to three possible sites; the Hanford site in Washington state, Deaf Smith County
in Texas, and Yucca Mountain in Nevada. While these three sites matched those
of the earlier environmental assessments, it did not match those of the later utility
analysis. This lead many in the potential host states to begin to accuse the DOE
of deciding on political rather than scientific or technical grounds, and this began
to erode trust in the DOE (Clary and Kraft, 1988; Kraft, 1991; Vandenbosch and
Vandenbosch, 2007). As a result of the increasing political controversy, Senator
Bennett Johnson moved to have Yucca Mountain, which had ranked the highest
in the 1986 analysis, selected as the only repository site to be considered. Yucca
Mountain was chosen in a House and Senate conference committee in December of
1987 and “hitched a ride” on the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987. This
large bill was signed by President Reagan on December 22nd 1987 (CQ Almanac,
1987).
The Nuclear Waste Policy Amendment Act of 1987 (NWPAA): The
NWPAA, though initially intended to build on the NWPA of 1982,
made major changes to UNF policy. The most prominent was desig-
nating Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the only site to be considered for
a repository. This change shifted the dynamics of the subsystem, and
has since been the basis of contention within the subsystem. Other
changes included postponement of the second repository in the eastern
United States, stating that the MRS option can only be used after a
permanent repository is licensed, and establishing the Nuclear Waste
Technical Review Board to provide additional oversight for the scien-
tific and technical work being done by the DOE (Walker, 2009).
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Yucca Mountain (1988-2009)
The selection of Yucca Mountain, far from settling the question of UNF disposal,
ratcheted up the intensity of the political controversy. This was in large part be-
cause of the political nature of how Yucca Mountain was chosen, in a conference
committee “behind closed doors” (Vandenbosch and Vandenbosch, 2007). Indeed,
the legislation is often referred to (by opponents) as the “screw Nevada” bill. The
controversy showed no signs of abating over time as Yucca Mountain has been
opposed by every member of Nevada’s Congressional delegation, both Republican
and Democrat. Members of Congress from Nevada have expressed their opposi-
tion in several ways over the years including “voting against the designation of
Yucca Mountain for the nation’s repository, cutting the Yucca Mountain budget
both in committee and on floor votes, filibusters in the Senate, and holding up
nominations” (Vandenbosch and Vandenbosch, 2007, 89).
Despite the resulting delays in implementing the legislation, the DOE continued
to perform site characterization at Yucca Mountain and Congress continued to
debate and make policies regarding UNF. The first piece of UNF related legislation
passed after the NWPAA was the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EnPA).
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EnPA): The EnPA was not exclusively
intended to address the UNF issue, but it included one section impor-
tant to Yucca Mountain. It directed the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to issue radiation exposure standards for Yucca Moun-
tain. The EnPA also required the EPA to contract with the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) to establish these standards The resulting
NAS report, issued in 1995, made three recommendations.1 First, it
recommended that a standard to be set to limit health risks to the in-
dividual. Second, it recommended that standards be set for peak risk,
1The NAS report can be found here http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309052890
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which could extend past 10,000 years. Finally, since the probability
of future human intrusion is difficult estimate, risk-calculations should
not require inclusion of the assumption of future human intrusion (Van-
denbosch and Vandenbosch, 2007).
The requirement that the EPA follow the guidelines set by the NAS and the fact
that the NAS noted that “peak risk” might occur past 10,000 years, set the stage
for a contentious legal battle in federal court. In 2001 the EPA issued regulations
regarding radiation exposure at Yucca Mountain based on the 10,000 year stan-
dard. The EPA was subsequently sued by Nevada and Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC) for not following the recommendations of the NAS report which
had noted peak risk could extend beyond 10,000 years. The Federal D.C. Court
of Appeals ruled in July 2004 that EPA regulation should indeed extend beyond
10,000 years, based on the EnPA requirement that the EPA follow NAS guidelines
(Vandenbosch and Vandenbosch, 2007). In 2008, the EPA issued revised standards
that include a maximum exposure of 15 millirem for the first 10,000 years of oper-
ation at Yucca Mountain and maximum exposure of 100 millirem from 10,000 to
one million years.2
The NWPA mandated that the federal government, DOE in particular, take
possession of the UNF currently stored on-site at the various nuclear power plants
around the country by 1998. However, it seemed clear by the early mid 1990s
that DOE was not going to meet that obligation, so as a result several bills were
put forward to establish a temporary storage site at Yucca Mountain. Having a
temporary site at Yucca Mountain could satisfy this requirement however, these
attempts were unsuccessful. The 106th Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act of 2000, which was vetoed by President Clinton in April of 2000 (CQ Almanac,
2000). This bill would have established temporary storage of UNF at Yucca Moun-
2On average, a person living in the U.S. is exposed to 360 millirems of radiation a year.
49
tain during the time in which the DOE was submitting a construction license to the
NRC for a permanent repository (Vandenbosch and Vandenbosch, 2007). Clinton’s
veto was sustained in the Senate by one vote (CQ Almanac, 2000). As a result of
not meeting the 1998 deadline, utilities companies have successfully sued to recoup
a portion of the funds placed in the Nuclear Waste Fund (CQ Researcher, 2011).
Policy change is often a result of exogenous changes in the macro policy en-
vironment. One such change are elections, and two elections in particular proved
to be consequential to UNF policy; the 2000 election of George W. Bush and the
2008 election of Barack Obama. The Presidency of George W. Bush helped eased
the recommendation and approval of Yucca Mountain as a UNF repository.
Yucca Mountain Approval : On January 10th, 2002 then Secretary of
Energy Spencer Abraham notified the state of Nevada that he intended
to recommend Yucca Mountain as a permanent repository to President
Bush. Secretary Abraham made his recommendation to President Bush
on February 14th, 2002 and President Bush approved Yucca Mountain
the next day. Following the procedures laid out in the NWPA, the
state of Nevada vetoed the approval on April 8th, 2002 but that veto
was overridden by Congress on May 8th, 2002 (CQ Almanac, 2002).
Once Yucca Mountain was formally approved, the next step involved the DOE
submitting a license application to the NRC. The DOE originally planned to submit
this license in 2004 (CQ Almanac, 2002), yet it was not submitted until the summer
of 2008.
Post-Yucca Mountain (2010- )
The NRC had begun consideration of the license application soon after it was sub-
mitted however, the Obama administration’s FY 2010 budget, submitted in 2009,
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drastically cut funding for the NRC’s license review process. In 2010 the DOE
formally withdrew the license application and in its FY 2011 budget requested no
funds at all for the Yucca Mountain project (CQ Researcher, 2011). These events
effectively canceled Yucca Mountain, fulfilling a campaign pledge that President
Obama made in 2008. During the campaign Obama stated that in terms of UNF,
“it is time to start exploring new alternatives for safe, long-term solutions based
on sound science” (CQ Researcher, 2011, 75). When announcing the license with-
drawal, President Obama called for a Presidential commission to examine options
for the storage of UNF.
The Blue Ribbon Commission for America’s Nuclear Future released their final
report in January 2012. The report made several recommendations including a the
use of a “consent-based” approach to the siting of a UNF repository, a new quasi-
governmental organization that would oversee all aspects of UNF management,
“prompt efforts” to develop a geologic site for UNF disposal, and “prompt efforts”
to develop temporary storage facilities in multiple locations (BRC, 2012).
3.3 Policy Evolution and Issue Dimensions
The discussion above outlined the major policy debates and legislation regarding
UNF policy and management. Using quantitative text analysis of Congressional
testimony, Chapter 2 described the major topics associated with UNF. More for-
mally, Chapter 2 determined the set of dimensions of the issue space that constitute
the UNF issue domain. Knowing about the major policy debates and about the
dimensions, I can derive some expectations about how the salience of dimensions
might shift leading into and following each major change. In this chapter, I ex-
amine the shifts in the salience of each dimension using Bayesian changepoint
analysis to determine the year and number of salience shifts. Following that, I use
the Herfindahl Index to examine competing hypotheses about policy evolution and
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issue complexity.
3.3.1 Salience Shifts and Issue Complexity
As seen in Figure 2.1 from Chapter 2, the salience (i.e., attention) of the UNF
dimensions seemed to vary over time by Congress. Policy change can often be a
result of shifts in the salience of one or more of the underlying dimensions of the
issue (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Jones, 1994b; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005).
However, policy change itself can shift the salience of dimensions, thereby mak-
ing some dimensions more/less salient than they were prior to the policy change.
For example, recent health-care reform requires all U.S. citizens to have health
insurance, and provides government subsidies for low-income Americans to pur-
chase health insurance. This major change likely makes questions of access to
health insurance less salient, yet will likely make questions of public costs more
salient. Below I posit several hypotheses about the evolution of UNF policy and
the salience of the various dimensions.3
Apart from salience shifts, policy evolution can also influence the complexity
of an issue. Complexity, as defined here, is based on the number of dimensions
being discussed in a given time period. An issue is considered highly complex
if multiple dimensions are being considered simultaneously, and conversely it is
considered less complex if only one or a few dimensions are being considered.
Policy evolution could either increase or reduce the number of dimensions that are
being considered. Therefore, below I posit two competing hypotheses about policy
evolution and issue complexity.
3Given the short time frame of the post-Yucca era, I do not posit any hypotheses about the
salient dimensions during that span of time.
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Pre-NWPA 1975-1982
Much of the discussion within Congress prior to the passage of the NWPA centered
around storage options once reprocessing was abandoned. At the heart of these de-
bates were questions about the proper regulatory safeguards and the scientific and
technical aspects of UNF management. Those questions were central to discussions
of the proper geologic medium (e.g., salt versus granite or shale), as discussed by
the 1978 Interagency Working Group. In addition, these dimensions shaped the
policy design inherent within the NWPA. As a result, the safety/regulation, sci-
ence/technical and storage dimensions are likely more salient prior to the NWPA,
compared to the post-NWPA, Yucca Mountain, post-Yucca policy eras. Therefore,
I posit the following hypotheses:
H1: The safety/regulation, science/technical, and storage dimensions
were more salient prior to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, rel-
ative to the other eras
Post-NWPA 1983-1987
The NWPA outlined the procedures for the DOE to select and characterize a
suitable site for a UNF repository. As a result, the focus was shifted from scientific
and technical questions to questions about program development and site selection.
Given these shifts, I posit that:
H2: The programmatic and site selection dimensions were more salient
following the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, relative to the other
eras
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Yucca Mountain 1988-2009
Following the NWPAA, which designated Yucca Mountain as the only site to be
considered as a UNF repository, it became clear that the adequacy and appropri-
ateness of the Yucca Mountain site would be the dominant dimension.
H3: The Yucca Mountain dimension was more salient following the
Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, relative to the other
periods
Issue Complexity
As discussed above, policy evolution—policy change over time—can influence the
complexity of a policy issue in one of two ways. First, it can reduce through
the number of salient dimensions through the debate and information processing
that occurs over time. Second, and conversely, information processing can increase
complexity over time. Theoretically, I can derive no directional expectations about
the effect of the evolution of UNF policy on issue complexity, but I can nevertheless
posit two competing hypotheses:
H4a: The used nuclear fuel issue will become less complex over the
four policy eras
H4b: The used nuclear fuel issue will become more complex over the
four policy eras
3.4 Data and Methods
The data for this chapter come from the verbal opening statements of a total
of 1,271 witnesses from 140 Congressional hearings about UNF. To examine the
shifts in dimension salience over time, I use the LDA analysis from Chapter 2 to
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determine the most salient dimension (i.e., the dimension with the highest topic
proportion) for each witness statement. For example, if a statement has estimated
topic proportions of 0.40 for the programmatic dimension, 0.10 for safety, 0.20
for Yucca Mountain, 0.10 for site selection, 0.05 for storage, and 0.15 for trans-
portation, than that statement would be coded as being about the programmatic
dimension. This produces a count variable based on the number of statements that
give primary weight to each dimension in each year.4 Table 3.2 shows the num-
ber and percent of statements where each dimension was the most salient, pooled
across the years 1975 to 2012. As shown, the programmatic dimension is the most
salient over all, with 26% of statements giving greatest weight to that dimension.
This is followed by site selection at 21%; Yucca Mountain and storage at 13%;
transportation at 10%; science/technical at 9%; and finally safety/regulation at
8%.5
Table 3.2: Dimension Salience Pooled by Years (1975-2012)
Dimension Count (Percent)
Programmatic 330 (26%)
Safety/Regulation 105 (8%)
Yucca Mountain 169 (13%)
Site Selection 265 (21%)
Science/Technical 110 (9%)
Storage 167 (13%)
Transportation 125 (10%)
To examine the nature of salience shifts and when changes in salience are likely
to occur, I use a Bayesian changepoint model (Chib, 1998). A Bayesian change-
point model allows estimation of endogenous shifts in time-series data. Specifi-
cally, it estimates a changepoint parameter, which is the probability of significant
changes in the mean value of a series at a point in time (Western and Kleykamp,
4Year is being used as opposed to Congress to increase the n size for the time-series analysis.
5These results closely match the mean topic proportions presented in Table 2.2 in Chapter 2.
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2004). Traditionally, intervention analysis was used in time-series analysis to de-
termine whether a significant change occurs following some exogenous event (e.g,
Enders and Sandler, 1993). However, with this type of analysis it is more difficult
to examine the dynamic nature of the relationship between dimension shifts and
policy change. Using changepoint analysis I can examine the salience shifts of each
dimension of UNF management both before and after policy change.
Given the count nature of the data, I use a Bayesian Poisson changepoint
model (Spirling, 2007; Brandt and Sandler, 2010; Park, 2010; Santifort, Sandler
and Brandt, 2013). The Poisson form of the model can be expressed as:
yt ∼ Poisson(µt)
µt = x
′
tβm, m = 1, . . . ,M
where µt indicates a count at time t, and M is the total number of states. A
state is a period of time in which the mean of the time-series is constant. The
βm parameter is the changepoint estimate for M number of states. A changepoint
occurs when the series changes states (i.e., the mean of the series shifts).
As noted, the changepoint model will estimate the probability of the series
shifting from one state to another. In addition, model fit measures can be compared
to examine the number of states M that exist in the series. In other words, the
changepoint model will estimate the location and number of significant shifts in
means for the time-series data. Using this approach, I can estimate how many times
and when salience shifts—a significant change in the mean number of statements
with a given dimension as its highest proportion—occurred within each of the
seven UNF dimensions. Models are estimated by varying the number of M states
and using the Bayes factor to determine best model fit.6
6The Bayes factor is the posterior odds ratio between the odds of one model relative to other
models (see Kass and Raftery, 1995; Gill, 2002, 201). The model with the largest natural log of
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Issue Dimensions and Policy Change
I posited several hypotheses about the salience of dimensions both prior to and
following the NWPA and the NWPAA. Using changepoint models, I estimate the
number and location of changepoints for each dimension across nearly four decades
(1975-2012). To test these hypotheses using the changepoint models I a) find the
highest mean number of statements for each dimension and the associated time
period (i.e., M state) and b) examine which era (pre-NWPA, post-NWPA, and
post-NWPAA) that time period, or M state, occurred. For example, H1 posited
that the safety/regulation dimension would be more salient pre-NWPA, relative to
the other policy eras. Evidence for this hypothesis would be if the highest mean for
the safety/regulation dimension occurred between 1975 to 1982. The results of the
changepoint models are presented in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. The vertical dashed lines
in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 represent the changepoints for each particular dimension.
Following the figures, I discuss the changepoints and dimension shifts within each
policy era. Then I conclude by performing an ANOVA to test the statistical
significance of the differences in dimension means across each policy era.
The first hypothesis posited that the safety/regulation, science/technical, and
storage dimensions would be most salient prior to the NWPA, as compared to
the other periods. As the third column in Table 3.3 shows, the safety/regulation
dimension was most salient (i.e., had its highest mean) from 1976-1980, prior to
the NWPA, consistent with the expectations of H1. From 1976-1980, the estimated
mean number of statements about the safety/regulation dimension was just over
13. The science and technical dimension was most salient from 1976 to 1985,
which leads into and follows the NWPA. Storage shifted in salience five times,
the Bayes factor relative to the other models is considered to have the best fit.
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Figure 3.1: Dimension Salience and Changepoints:
Programmatic, Safety, Yucca, Site
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Figure 3.2: Dimension Salience and Changepoints:
Sci/Tech, Storage, Transportation
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Table 3.3: Issue Dimensions, Changepoints, and Policy Eras
Dimension Change Point Mean Count (Years) Policy Era
Programmatic
2.772 (1975-1977) Pre-NWPA
1978 (+) 15.218 (1978-1984) Pre/Post NWPA
1985 (+) 37.727 (1985-1987) Post-NWPA
1988 (−) 2.225 (1988-2012) Yucca Mountain
Safety/Regulation
3.0617 (1975) Pre-NWPA
1976 (+) 13.3499 (1976-1980) Pre-NWPA
1981 (−) 0.7388 (1981-2012) All
Yucca Mountain
0.1933 (1975-1983) Pre/Post NWPA
1984 (+) 1.724 (1984-1990) Post-NWPA/Yucca
1991 (+) 7.717 (1991-2012) Yucca Mountain
Site Selection
8.453 (1975-1982) Pre-NWPA
1983 (−) 0.507 (1983) Post-NWPA
1984 (+) 22.751 (1984-1987) Post-NWPA
1988 (−) 0.505 (1988-1990) Yucca Mountain
1991 (+) 7.630 (1991-1997) Yucca Mountain
1998 (−) 1.454 (1998) Yucca Mountain
1999 (+) 1.940 (1999-2003) Yucca Mountain
2004 (−) 0.165 (2004-2012) Yucca Mountain
Science/Technical
1.018 (1975) Pre-NWPA
1976 (+) 8.387 (1976-1985) Pre/Post NWPA
1986 (−) 1.331 (1986-1993) Post-NWPA/Yucca
1994 (−) 0.418 (1994-2012) Yucca Mountain
Storage
11.946 (1975-1982) Pre-NWPA
1983 (−) 0.202 (1983-1986) Post-NWPA
1987 (+) 7.457 (1987) Post-NWPA
1988 (−) 0.553 (1988-1993) Yucca Mountain
1994 (+) 5.776 (1994-1995) Yucca Mountain
1996 (−) 1.706 (1996-2012) Yucca Mountain
Transportation
0.249 (1975-1977) Pre-NWPA
1978 (+) 9.037 (1978-1980) Pre-NWPA
1981 (−) 0.495 (1981-1983) Pre/Post NWPA
1984 (+) 12.546 (1984-1988) Post-NWPA/Yucca
1989 (−) 0.916 (1989-2012) Yucca Mountain
Highest mean in bold
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but, as expected, was most salient from 1975 to 1982. These results are consistent
with my expectations about the salience of the safety/regulation, science/technical,
and storage dimensions prior to the NWPA vis a vis the other time periods. The
salience of the science/technical dimension did not shift until 1985, three years after
the NWPA. This shift is likely because 1985 was just prior to the recommendation
by the DOE that only three candidate sites—Nevada, Washington, and Texas—be
chosen for characterization.
Hypothesis H2 posited that the programmatic and site selection would be most
salient following the NWPA. As shown in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.1, the program-
matic dimension was most salient between 1985 and 1987, when an estimated
38 statements were mostly about that dimension. This result is consistent with
H2. Also as expected, the site selection dimension was most salient from 1984
to 1987, the years following the NWPA; the DOE environmental assessments and
multi-attribute analysis; and prior to the NWPAA of 1987.
Finally, the third hypothesis posited that the Yucca Mountain dimension would
be most salient following the NWPAA. The results were consistent with this ex-
pectation, with an estimated number of just under 8 statements giving greatest
weight to the Yucca Mountain dimension from 1991-2012. The Yucca Mountain
dimension also experienced a salience shift much earlier, in 1984, as the DOE was
considering it (along with other sites) to host a potential repository. The second
shift in salience is estimated to be in 1991, just prior to the EnPA.7
In general, this analysis confirms my hypotheses about the nature of shifting
dimensional salience. Looking at the estimated mean number of statements for
each dimension and the years in which that mean was relatively constant, allowed
for the comparison of salience across the UNF policy eras. As shown, these means
tended to be highest in the years that were expected, based on my historical anal-
7The four year lag is likely a result of the fact that only four hearings occurred from 1988 to
1990.
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ysis of UNF policy in the U.S. While the changepoint models estimated the mean
for each state, the probability of a changepoint, and the number of changepoints, it
does not test the statistical significance of the difference in those estimated means.
To test for statistical differences in the means of each dimension across each policy
era, I use an ANOVA test. The means for each era represent that average number
of documents that gave the greatest weight to each respective dimension. The
results of the ANOVA tests are shown in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Mean Dimension Salience by Policy Eras
Era Program Safe Yucca Site Sci/Tech Storage Trans
Pre-NWPA 13.88 10.63 0.13 9.38 9 13.38 4.38
Post-NWPA 33.8 1 2.4 22.6 4.8 2.8 11.4
Yucca 2.15 0.75 7 3.85 0.7 2.2 1.65
Post-Yucca 3.5 na 8 na na 1 na
F Test 10.06*** 12.35*** 4.58** 6.95** 5.975** 7.165*** 3.247*
The results, presented in Table 3.4, show that the mean differences are statis-
tically significant. In the Pre-NWPA era, the safety/regulation, science/technical,
and storage dimensions were all significantly more salient, meeting my expecta-
tions. The programmatic and site selection dimensions were, as expected, more
salient in the post-NWPA era, relative to the the other eras. In addition, the
transportation dimension was also more salient during this time. This is likely
because transportation was a significant concern for the potential host states. The
Yucca Mountain dimension has its highest mean in the post-Yucca era, however
this mean was not statistically significant.8 However, the mean of 7 is significantly
different than both the pre-NWPA and post-NWPA policy eras. The post-Yucca
period consists of only 5 hearings with 24 total witnesses. These hearings are
largely about the withdrawal of the Yucca Mountain license application, therefore
Yucca Mountain is still the most salient dimensions even in the post-Yucca period.
8This lack of statistical significance is a result of the high variance associated with the low
sample size of 24 witnesses for the 112th Congress.
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Apart from estimating the means for each state in the time-series, the change-
point models also estimate the year of the changepoint and the number of change-
points for each dimension. These dynamics are worth examining to evaluate how
salience shifts precede and follow policy change. The full results are shown in Table
3.3, and below I discuss each dimension in turn.
• The programmatic dimension had an estimated increase in salience in both
1978 and 1985, and an estimated decline in salience in 1988. The program-
matic dimension increased in salience in 1978 leading up to the NWPA, as
the initial legislation was being discussed and increased again following the
NWPA.
• The safety/regulation dimension experienced two estimated salience shifts;
an increase in 1976 and a decrease in 1981. Although the safety/regulation
dimension was most salient prior to the NPWA, both of these shifts occurred
within that period.
• Yucca Mountain became somewhat more salient in 1984, following the DOE’s
environmental assessment and leading into the NWPAA. But, as expected,
it was most salient from 1991 to 2012, after the NWPAA.
• The site selection dimension seems to be the most volatile; experiencing the
most shifts with seven. This dimension was most salient from 1984 to 1987,
the years following the NWPA and prior to the NWPAA of 1987. How-
ever, it increased in salience in 1991, and from 1991 to 1997, the estimated
mean number of statements about about site selection was 7.63. During this
period, there were several bills introduced in Congress about establishing a
temporary MRS site (Vandenbosch and Vandenbosch, 2007).
• The science/technical dimension had three shifts, and was most salient from
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1976 to 1985. This time period covers the development of the NWPA and
the narrowing of the sites to be considered to host a UNF repository.
• The storage dimension experienced five salience shifts, yet was most salient
from 1975 to 1982. This dimension increased in salience in 1987, just prior to
the NWPAA, and increased again in 1994 as temporary storage sites began
to be considered.
• The transportation dimension was most salient from 1984 to 1988. This
was during the period that DOE was narrowing down the number of sites
to be considered, and transportation to and from the potential site was an
important consideration.
The pattern of shifts in the salience of issue dimensions helps define the primary
eras in the evolution of the UNF policy domain over the decades under considera-
tion. In the early development of the UNF subsystem, prior to the NWPA, the most
salient dimensions were those that focused on development of programs to address
UNF (programmatic), the needed safe guards and standards (safety/regulation),
questions concerning the different geologic medium (science/technical) and the
need for away-from-reactor storage following the decision not to reprocess UNF
(storage). These dimensions defined the issue at that time and were addressed in
the NWPA. Following the passage of the NWPA, questions shifted to the govern-
ments role in developing and implementing the programs called for in the NWPA
(programmatic). In addition, concern began to grow, particularly within potential
host states, about the process the DOE was using to determine which site should
be selected (site selection). This started to generate intense political controversy
and disagreement between states and the federal government. The UNF issue
became defined at this time as one of political controversy over the process of se-
lecting a site to be studied. This growing political controversy, the high ranking of
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Yucca Mountain in the DOE’s analysis, and the relatively weak political position
of Nevada lead directly into the NWPAA, which chose Yucca Mountain as the only
site to be considered.
The above analysis illustrates that the issue space underlying the UNF issue
is multidimensional, and that those dimensions shift in importance as the policy
issue evolves. In the next section I turn to the related matter of changing issue
complexity. Specifically, I address whether the multiple dimensions of UNF tend
be considered in more or less equal proportions, making the issue more complex,
or whether the shifts in salience discussed above lead to a focus on only a few
dimensions. In addition, I discuss whether the UNF issue became more or less
complex as the issue evolved.
3.5.2 Issue Dimensions and Issue Complexity
As noted above, policy evolution can either serve to increase or decrease issue
complexity, where complexity is defined as a function of the number of dimensions
being discussed. To test these competing hypotheses, I use the Herfindahl index.
The Herfindahl index originated as measure of market concentration of firms, but
has since been used to measure the jurisdictional diversity of Congressional com-
mittees (Hardin, 1998; Baumgartner, Jones and MacLeod, 2000), the interplay
between the media and Congress (Jones and Wolfe, 2010), and the diversity of
terrorists attacks (Santifort, Sandler and Brandt, 2013). For my purposes, I use
the Herfindahl index to measure the diversity of the dimensions being discussed,
both overall and aggregated across the 19 Congresses in the dataset. The index
can be expressed as:
1−
n∑
i
(p(di))
2
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where p(di) is the proportion of total statements where dimension di was the most
salient. The index ranges from 0 to 1, with values closer to 1 indicating more
complexity—numerous dimensions being discussed in similar proportions—and a
value closer to 0 indicating less complexity, which means fewer dimensions being
discussed.9 A maximum complexity value of 1 would be obtained if each dimension
had the same proportion of total statements. In my analysis, that would occur if
each dimension was most salient in ∼14.25% of the statements. If all dimensions
had been discussed equally, this would indicate a highly complex issue that can’t
be defined along only one or a few dimensions. A complexity value close to 0, on
the other hand, would indicate that nearly all the statements focused on the same
dimension. Table 3.5 shows the overall complexity score for the entire period and
the count and percent of statements for each of the seven dimensions.
Table 3.5: Overall Complexity and Issue Dimensions
Complexity Dimensions (Count\Percent)
All Policy Eras(1975-2012)
Programmatic (330\26%)
Site Selection (265\21%)
Yucca Mountain (169\13%)
0.83 Storage (167\13%)
Transportation (125\10%)
Science/Technical (110\9%)
Safety/Regulation (105\8%)
As seen in Table 3.5, the overall complexity of the UNF issue is 0.83, which
indicates a high degree of complexity. Overall, the programmatic dimension was
the most salient, accounting for just over a fourth (26%) of all statements. This is
followed closely by the site selection dimension at 21%, whereas the remaining five
dimensions seem to be clustered more closely, ranging from 13 to 9 percent of all
statements. These results are evidence that the UNF issue is highly complex with
9The Herfindahl index was originally scaled so that a smaller value indicated a more diffuse,
or less concentrated, activity. However, for ease of interpretation I use 1 − H which allows a
higher value to indicate increased complexity.
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Figure 3.3: Issue Complexity by Congress and Policy Eras
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multiple dimensions being considered.
Hypotheses H4a and H4b were competing hypotheses about the relative com-
plexity of the UNF issue, following major policy changes. H4a posited that policy
issues become less complex as they evolve, whereas H4b posit that issues become
more complex. The null hypothesis in either case would be no significant change
in complexity over time. To test these hypotheses, I calculated a complexity score
for each of the 19 Congresses, the 94th through the 112th, within the period of
study. Figure 3.3 plots the complexity index for each Congress, and the vertical
lines indicate the significant policy changes that demarcated each of the four policy
eras.
As can be seen, the issue of UNF management was highly complex from the
94th to the 108th Congress, or 1975 through 2004. However, a relatively steep
decline in complexity occurred in the mid 2000s. The complexity index in the
108th Congress was 0.81, yet that fell to 0.61 in the 109th and fell again to 0.41 in
the 110th Congress. This period follows the formal approval of Yucca Mountain in
2002 by the Bush administration and the 107th Congress. Following the approval
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of Yucca Mountain, the 108th Congress (2003-2004) held four hearings dealing
with UNF issues. These hearings touched on several dimensions of the UNF issue,
thereby increasing complexity even though the discusses were largely in the context
of Yucca Mountain. For example, the Senate Appropriations subcommittee on
Energy and Water Development Appropriations (with Harry Reid from Nevada
as ranking member) held hearings on possible silica exposure of workers at the
Yucca Mountain site. Breathing in silica dust can lead to silicosis, which can be
dangerous and causes inflammation and scarring of the lungs. Therefore, apart
from Yucca Mountain, this hearing touched on the safety/regulation dimension.
A second hearing was about the proposed transportation routes to and from the
Yucca Mountain site. Both of these examples illustrate how the issue of UNF
remained so complex for so long. However, the decrease in complexity that began
in the 109th Congress, likely comes as a result of a shift of focus to Yucca Mountain
as the DOE prepared, and subsequently submitted, the license application to the
NRC. Following the withdrawal of the license application, an increase in complexity
can be seen. It is likely that the debates about UNF management will continue to
become more complex as they continue.
Overall, the UNF issue remained highly complex and showed no signs of de-
creasing as the policy debate evolved. This seems to indicate that policy change
had no impact on the complexity of the UNF issue. To formally test hypotheses
H4a and H4b, I compared, using an ANOVA test, the mean score of the complexity
measure across each of the four policy eras. The results are shown in Table 3.6.
As can be seen in Table 3.6, the mean complexity score decreased from the pre-
NWPA to the post-Yucca period, however these differences are not statistically
significant. This finding indicates that some issues, such as UNF, remain highly
complex even following major policy changes.
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Table 3.6: Issue Complexity and Policy Eras
Era Mean of Complexity Index
Pre-NWPA 0.78
Post-NWPAA 0.70
Yucca 0.67
Post-Yucca 0.51
F Test 2.047ns
3.6 Summary
This chapter examined the policy evolution of the UNF issue. Specifically, it pro-
vided a background on the development of the UNF subsystem. This background
included a summary discussion of the debates and major policy events that oc-
curred in the UNF subsystem from 1975 to 2012. Following this background and
the dimensions outlined in Chapter 2, I posited several hypotheses about the shift-
ing salience of the various policy dimensions prior to and following policy change.
Using Bayesian changepoint analysis, I showed that the salience of UNF dimen-
sions is related to policy evolution in systematic and predictable ways. In addition,
using ANOVA tests I found these difference to be statistically significant. Next I
tested two competing hypotheses about policy evolution and the complexity of the
UNF issue. The results indicated that as the UNF subsystem evolved, it became
less complex, however the reduction in the complexity measure was not statistically
significant. Over, the UNF issue remained quite complex in each policy era. In
sum, the issue of UNF management is inherently complex and multidimensional,
which presents unique challenges to policymakers dealing with this issue.
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Chapter 4
Institutions, Information Processing, and Issue Definitions
The study of institutions has long played a key role in understanding the policy
process (Smith and Larimer, 2009). Early political science was built around careful
studies of the major policymaking institutions like Congress and the bureaucracy.
Institutions provide structure, through rules, norms, and procedures, in the polit-
ical and policymaking process, thereby reducing the costs associated with making
collective decisions. Absent this institutional structure, consensus in a majoritar-
ian system where policy choices are made along multiple dimensions is extremely
difficult to achieve (see Shepsle, 1989). In this chapter, I examine how institutions
work to shape issue definitions through specialization and expertise. Specifically, I
examine how committees in Congress structure the dimensions of the UNF policy
debate.
4.1 Institutions and Information Processing
Many policy issues are complex and multidimensional and, as shown in Chap-
ter 3, the issue of UNF is no exception. The large number of such issues that
policymakers must address feeds into the broader complexity of the policymaking
environment. In brief, the policymaking environment can be characterized as filled
with complex issues and awash in information signals about those issues. In such
an environment the central question becomes how do policymakers make policy
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choices? Social choice theorists have noted that in complex environments, where
preferences are multidimensional, reaching an equilibrium point can at best be
difficult and at worst impossible (Riker, 1988). Without such equilibrium, there
exists no theoretical basis for expecting stability. However, stability, punctuated
by change, seems to be a central feature of the policy process (Tullock, 1981;
Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). One of the major reasons for this stability is the
role played by the various policymaking institutions (Shepsle, 1979).
Stability is imposed on the chaos of the policymaking environment through
institutions and institutional arrangements that bring order to the chaos through
rules. Institutions are defined here as a “set of individuals acting according to
common rules resulting in collective outcomes” (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005,
151). These common rules provide structure in the policy process by organizing
and restricting conflict (Shepsle and Weingast, 1981); and by reducing the costs
associated with decision-making in a complex environment. These types of costs
can include decision costs (costs of coming to a decision), transaction costs (costs
of taking an action), information costs (costs of gathering and processing informa-
tion), and cognitive costs (costs associated with limited cognitive capacity) (Jones
and Baumgartner, 2005, 151-152). While institutions can work to lower each of
these kinds of costs for policymakers, I will focus my attention on the role of
institutions in the reduction of information costs. Information costs have often
been considered equivalent to search costs, where costs are associated with finding
information relevant to the decision at hand. Traditionally, information for policy-
making was considered costly because it was under-supplied, and often kept hidden
for strategic purposes. Costs are then incurred by policymakers wishing to obtain
this information, often through costly monitoring of the environment and over-
sight of bureaucratic agencies (see Niskanen, 1971; Lupia and McCubbins, 1994;
Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999; Huber and Shipan, 2000). A second component
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of information costs are the costs associated with the processing of information.
Processing costs are a result of the oversupply of information, and are incurred
by the organizing and prioritizing of information (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005).
Institutions can lower processing costs by “winnowing” the number of items (i.e.,
legislation) (Krutz, 2005) or dimensions (Talbert and Potoski, 2002; Jones, Talbert
and Potoski, 2003) being considered.1
Institutions work to lower information costs (i.e., search costs and processing
costs) through parallel processing and the specialization that results. As noted,
policymakers are faced with a multitude of issues at any given time, and were they
only able to process them in a serial fashion (one at a time) it is likely few policy
actions would be taken. Institutions however allow for the processing of multiple
issues at once (Jones, 1994b; Workman, Jones and Jochim, 2009). Parallel process-
ing within institutions is largely accomplished through multiple sub-units within
the larger institutions. These sub-units focus and specialize on particular issues,
or dimensions of issues. A prime example is the committee structure in Congress.
Another example is the various sub-units within bureaucratic organizations, like
the (former) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management within the Depart-
ment of Energy. Yet another example, at a different scale, is policy subsystems,
which are anchored in institutional arrangements and focused on a specific policy
area or issue.
As noted above, the focus of this chapter is how institutions reduce infor-
mation costs and structure multidimensional policy issues by highlighting certain
dimensions of the issue over others. Specifically, I examine Congress and how it
1It should be noted that institutional structure can also raise processing costs by producing
more information that needs to be considered. Indeed, the growth of information produced
from Congressional committees is associated with the growth of bureaucratic agencies (Jones,
Baumgartner and de la Mare, 2005). However, my focus is on the ways in which committees use
expertise to highlight some dimensions over others. By making some dimensions more salient
than others committees provide a signal about which dimensions should be most prominent,
thereby reducing processing costs for the policymaker.
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structures the dimensions of UNF management through expert committees with
jurisdictional authority within a policy subsystem. (Shepsle and Weingast, 1987;
Krehbiel, 1991).
4.2 Committees and Issue Dimensions
The role that committees play in defining policy issues is closely linked to their
role in anchoring policy subsystems. Policy subsystems are sets of institutional
arrangements, nested within the larger policymaking environment, that are orga-
nized around particular policy areas or issues. Subsystems are anchored by the
sub-units within the policymaking institutions, like Congressional committees and
smaller units within bureaucracies (e.g., OCRWM within DOE), that have policy
decision or implementation authority in that domain. The committees role in a
subsystem is based on the committee’s expertise and jurisdictional span.
Committee expertise is developed through the specialization that occurs as a re-
sult of the parallel processing of information. In an expertise based understanding
of committees, committees are seen as agents to the larger institution of Congress
(Maltzman, 1998). The Congress delegates information gathering and processing
to committees to reduce policy uncertainty (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1990; Krehbiel,
1991). Often this uncertainty is characterized as uncertainty about the relationship
between public policy and outcomes (Krehbiel, 1991; Esterling, 2004), however I
characterize uncertainty as uncertainty regarding which dimensions of an issue are
or should be most salient. Committees reduce this type of uncertainty by signal-
ing certain dimensions, through the hearing process, to the full body.2 There is
likely to be significant variation in the dimensions that committees find salient, and
therefore signal to the full Congress. This variation is in part a function of their
2Committees function to assist members of Congress in achieving multiple goals (Fenno, 1973),
however my focus is on the information processing purpose of committees.
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expertise. Any one committee cannot be expert on all issues or even all dimensions
of a issue, due to high information costs. Developing expertise on any one issue is
costly, both in terms of time and energy, but also in terms of opportunity costs.
Opportunity costs are high because becoming expert on one issue(s) negates the
ability to become expert on another issue(s). Due to the nature of the costs of
expertise and the technical nature of the UNF issue, it is likely that only a few
committees will be active in the UNF subsystem.
In addition to expertise, a committee’s role in a subsystem is dictated by their
jurisdictional span. Some committees, such as the Energy and Commerce commit-
tee in the House, are active across multiple issues and subsystems, whereas other
committees are more limited in scope (Baumgartner, Jones and MacLeod, 2000;
Sheingate, 2006). The jurisdictional structure in Congress is dynamic and features
competition between committees attempting to exert influence over particular is-
sues (Talbert, Jones and Baumgartner, 1995; King, 1997; Baumgartner, Jones and
MacLeod, 2000; Sheingate, 2006). A key feature of policy subsystems is that actors
that perceive themselves to be at an advantage attempt to keep issues contained
within the subsystem to avoid the large scale disruptions that might result from
the increased involvement of other policy actors and institutions (Baumgartner
and Jones, 1993; Worsham, 1998; Baumgartner and Jones, 2002). In a similar
fashion, committees seek to protect their jurisdictional turf from abrupt changes
and/or other committees seeking to expand their jurisdiction (King, 1997).
In brief, committees anchor subsystems through the expertise and jurisdictional
authority they development as a result of the parallel processing of policy issues.
However, committees often try to expand their influence into other subsystems.
Giving the costs associated with the development of expertise, it is likely that
committees attempt to leverage their expertise when competing for jurisdictional
control. These dynamics create a situation where a few committees, based on
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their expertise and jurisdiction, are likely to be central to the subsystem and
committees that attempt to exert influence do so based on their expertise. For
example, in the tobacco policy domain the Agriculture committees in the House
and Senate were the core subsystem committees throughout the 1940s and 1950s.
At that time, tobacco was largely an agriculture issue, however following the 1964
Surgeon General’s report that linked tobacco use to poor health outcomes, other
committees, particularly the House and Senate commerce committees, with an
expertise in health issues began to hold hearings (Worsham, 2006). As a result,
the salient dimensions of the tobacco subsystem started to shift from the growing
of tobacco to health concerns associated with tobacco.
The tensions inherent in committee expertise and expertise-based jurisdictional
competition likely create subsystems that are structured by a few core committees
that act as institutional anchors, coupled with committees that hold hearings about
specific dimensions related to their expertise. Having developed expertise in one
dimension of an issue may allow committees to gain a foothold within that issue.
Taken together, committee expertise and committee jurisdiction work to keep the
number of committees involved with the issue of UNF at a minimum. However,
when other committees become active in the subsystem they will likely only be
involved in a few dimensions. Therefore, I posit the following hypotheses:
H1: The majority of hearings about used nuclear fuel few will take place
in only a few committees
H2: Committees outside these few will hold hearings about dimensions
within their realm of expertise
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Figure 4.1: Number of Used Nuclear Fuel Hearings by Congress (94th–112th)
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4.3 Data and Methods
The test the hypotheses presented above, I draw on the 140 Congressional hearings
about UNF that occurred from 1975 to 2012. Figure 4.1 illustrates the number of
hearings held per Congress.
Overall, the 96th Congress (1979-1980) held the most hearings at 24.3 As
discussed in Chapter 3, this was around the time that the nuclear energy subsystem
was undergoing a profound shift and the used nuclear subsystem was being formed.
The fewest number of hearings per Congress was 2, which occurred in the 105th,
107th, and 110th Congresses. The hearings were coded by Congress, year, chamber,
committee, sub-committee, type (legislative or nonlegislative), and majority party.
Dependent Variables : The dependent variables for the analysis in this chapter are
the seven dimensions of the UNF issue. As a reminder, these dimensions include
programmatic, safety/regulation, Yucca Mountain, site selection, science/technical,
storage, and transportation. The dependent variables were drawn from the ver-
3As noted in Chapter 2, these hearings do not include appropriation hearings.
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bal opening statements of each witness at each hearing and proportions for each
dimension were estimated for each statement. These proportion estimates range
from 0 to 1 and are treated as continuous. As shown in Chapter 2, these estimated
proportions can be small, near 0, indicating that particular dimension was hardly
discussed in that statement, or rather large (a maximum of 0.82) which indicates
that the majority of that statement (an estimated 82%) was about that particular
dimension.
Independent Variables : The hypotheses in this chapter posit that committees vary
both in their involvement in the UNF subsystem and the attention they play to
the various dimensions of UNF policy. Therefore, the main independent variables
of interest are the various committees in Congress that held hearings dealing with
UNF from 1975 to 2012. The analysis examines the number of committees holding
hearings, the number of witnesses appearing in those hearings, and the number
of Congresses in which each committee held a hearing about UNF. In addition,
OLS models are used to estimate the attention (i.e., salience) that each committee
gives to the various UNF dimensions, controlling for other factors that are discussed
below.
As noted, the main focus in this chapter is the central role that congressional
committees can play in policy subsystems and issue definitions. This role is argued
to be based largely on the expertise and jurisdictional scope of the committees,
however other institutional factors might play a role in determining the attention
that committees pay to particular issues or issue dimensions. One of the largest
factors is the political party that holds the majority in Congress. The majority
party in either chamber of Congress has immense power to set the agenda and
determine procedures (Cox and McCubbins, 2005). In addition, political parties
can act as important cues in determining salient legislation (Krutz, 2005). Given
the influence of political parties, it is possible that some dimensions become more
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or less salient depending on the majority party. Therefore, when estimating the
attention committees pay to the dimensions of the UNF debate, I use a dummy
variable for Republican majority to statistically control for party effects. The vari-
able is coded 1 if Republicans held the majority in the chamber and 0 if Democrats
held the majority.
Apart from party control, the type of hearing, legislative or nonlegislative (i.e.,
oversight or investigative), might have an impact on the salience of the dimen-
sions. Legislative hearings imply an institutional demand for a different type of
information, because the information needed to consider legislation is likely differ-
ent than the information needed for oversight. For example, the safety/regulation
dimension is not likely to be as salient in a hearing considering legislation versus
a hearing exploring the progress of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in devel-
oping safety regulations for a repository site. To control for hearing type I created
a legislative hearing dummy variable, which is coded 1 if the hearing considered
legislation and 0 otherwise.4
Finally, as shown in Chapter 3, the salience of the various UNF dimensions
vary over time across the four UNF policy eras. To control for this effect, I used
fixed effects for each of the four eras. This variable was coded 1 for the pre-NWPA
era, 2 for the NWPAA era, 3 for the Yucca Mountain era, and 4 for the Post-Yucca
era. The pre-NWPA era was the excluded referent. The analysis were performed
separately for the House and the Senate, and the results for the House are presented
in the next section, followed by the results for the Senate.
4The hearing summaries provide a clear indication if the intended purpose of the hearing is
to consider a specific bill or set of bills.
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 House
The first hypothesis posited that, due to subsystem dynamics and expertise, the
number of committees active in the UNF subsystem (i.e., holding hearings) would
be small. Put another way, of the committees that are involved in the UNF
subsystem, the bulk of actively will be contained to only a few. To test this
hypothesis, I examine the number of UNF hearings held by each of the committees
involved, the number of witnesses in those hearings, and the number of Congresses
in which each committee held UNF hearings. Taken together, these measures
illustrate the level of activity in the UNF subsystem for each committee. Overall,
seven House committees held hearings about UNF.5 These committees, the number
of hearings, witnesses, and Congresses are shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: UNF Subsystem Activity by House Committee
Committee Hearings Witnesses Congresses
Budget 3 12 2
Energy and Commerce 26 254 15
Foreign Affairs 1 4 1
Governmental Reform 8 53 3
Natural Resources 23 314 10
Science, Space, and Technology 10 77 6
Transportation and Infrastructure 2 14 2
Number of hearings χ2(59.62) significant at p < 0.001
As shown in Table 4.1, the majority of hearings in the House were held by the
Energy and Commerce committee and the Natural Resources committee. The χ2
(59.62)—based on differences in the number of hearings—is statistically significant
and this confirms my expectation that the majority of the hearings are held by a
5Committee names are based on the names used in the 112th Congress, the last Congress in the
dataset. Changes in committees names were keep consistent using the Congressional commit-
tees codebook from the Policy Agendas website http://www.policyagendas.org/page/datasets-
codebooks
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few expert committees.6 In addition, the Natural Resources committee had the
most witnesses at 314, and the Energy and Commerce committee was the most
active across time, holding hearings in 15 different Congresses. Following Energy
and Commerce and Natural Resources was the Science, Space, and Technology
committee with 10 hearings and 77 witnesses across 6 Congresses. Next was Gov-
ernmental Reform committee with 8 hearings and 53 witnesses in 3 sessions of
Congress. Finally, the Budget committees held 3 hearings, Transportation and
Infrastructure held 2, and the Foreign Affairs committee held 1 hearing dealing
with UNF. Broadly speaking, the Energy and Commerce and Natural Resources
committees were the foci of committee expertise in the House for the issue of UNF.
Next, I examine whether significant differences in the salience of dimensions existed
across committees in the House.
Hypothesis H2 stated that committees, outside of the core subsystem commit-
tees, that become active in a subsystem do so by leveraging their expertise in a
dimension(s) relevant to the subsystem. Evidence in support of the working hy-
pothesis would show that relative to the anchor committee(s), less attention would
be paid to most dimensions, and more attention paid to only one or a few di-
mensions. For example, a clear expectation is that the Transportation committee
will pay more attention to the transportation dimension and less attention to the
others. To test this hypothesis, I use OLS analysis with robust standards errors.
The committees are dummy variables and the anchor committee is the excluded
referent. For the House analysis, the Natural Resources committee is the excluded
referent based on the fact that they saw the most witnesses.7 The results of the
OLS analysis are present in Table 4.2.
Looking across the second row of Table 4.2 we see that the Budget committee
6In this case a null finding would show a more even distribution of hearings across committees.
7While, the Energy and Commerce committee held the most hearings in the most Congresses,
I chose the Natural Resources committee as the referent because dimension salience is based on
witness testimony and they had seen the most witnesses.
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Table 4.2: OLS Estimates of Dimension Salience by House Committee
Program Safe Yucca Site Sci/Tech Storage Trans
(Intercept) 0.15∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Budget −0.06∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗−0.13∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.08∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
Energy/Commerce −0.01 −0.02∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗−0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign Affairs −0.08∗∗∗−0.08∗∗∗−0.00 −0.11∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗−0.05∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
Government Reform −0.02 0.08∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗−0.04∗ −0.03† −0.04∗ 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Science 0.06∗∗ 0.02 −0.01 −0.07∗∗∗ 0.03† 0.01 −0.04∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Trans/Infrastructure −0.05† −0.06∗∗∗−0.04∗∗ −0.01 −0.07∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
Republican Majority 0.01 −0.00 0.05∗∗ 0.01 0.02∗ −0.05∗∗ −0.05∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Legislative 0.03∗ −0.05∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02∗ −0.03∗∗ −0.01 0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 728 728 728 728 728 728 728
adj. R2 0.18 0.33 0.63 0.13 0.11 0.26 0.21
Resid. sd 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.10
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effect for eras not shown
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
was significantly less likely than the Natural Resources committee to hear testi-
mony about all the dimensions but the Yucca Mountain and storage dimensions.
The Budget committee was significantly more likely to pay attention to the Yucca
Mountain dimension, and no more or less likely to pay attention to the storage
dimension. The Energy and Commerce committee, the other core UNF subsys-
tem committee, was more likely to find the Yucca Mountain dimension and the
storage dimension salient. The Foreign Affairs committee paid more attention to
the storage dimension, than the Natural Resources committee. The Governmen-
tal Reform committee focused their attention on the safety/regulation dimension,
and the Science committee focused more on the programmatic and the science and
technical dimension.8 Finally, the Transportation committee, as expected, paid
the most attention to the transportation dimension.
8The science and technical dimension was significant in a one-tailed test.
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Figure 4.2: Estimated Dimension Salience for each House Committee
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For the control variables, the Yucca Mountain and the science and technical
dimensions were more salient, on average, when the Republicans held the majority
in the House, whereas the storage and transportation dimensions were less salient.
The programmatic, site selection, and transportation dimension were all more
salient, on average, in hearings that considered legislation relative to nonlegislative
hearings. The safety/regulation and the science and technical dimensions were less
salient during legislative hearings.
Using the OLS models presented in Table 4.2, I estimate the salience of each
dimension for each of the committees active in the UNF subsystem. These esti-
mates hold the Republican majority and legislative hearing variables consistent at
their median. In addition, I hold the policy era variable constant at it mode, which
is the first policy era (pre-NWPA). The results are presented in Figure 4.2.
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These estimates help to illustrate the differences in salience that the various
attach to each dimension. As shown, the Natural Resources committee’s atten-
tion is relatively evenly split across the program, safety/regulation, site selection,
science/technical, and storage dimensions. For the Budget committee however,
the Yucca Mountain dimension is most salient with an estimated salience of 0.41.
This means that, on average, an estimated 41% of the testimony heard about
UNF by the Budget committee focused on the Yucca Mountain dimension. The
storage dimensions was estimated to be the most salient from the Energy and
Commerce committee at 0.26. Storage was also the most salient dimension for
the Foreign Affairs, with an estimate of 0.58. The committee on Government
Reform heard the most testimony on the safety/regulation dimension. Attention
of the Science, Space, and Technology committee was relatively even on the pro-
gram, safety/regulation, science/technical, and storage dimensions. Finally, for
the Transportation committee an estimated 40% of the testimony focused on the
transportation dimension.
Overall, these results tend to confirm both hypotheses. In the House, the En-
ergy and Commerce and Natural Resources committees held the most hearings
and tended to spread their attention evenly across dimensions. These are also
the committees that would be expected to have expertise related to UNF man-
agement given that the issue crosses energy, environmental, and science/technical
boundaries. In addition, committees that participated less frequently tended to
focus their attention on one or two dimensions related to their expertise. Most no-
tably, the Transportation and Infrastructure committee was the most active on the
transportation dimension. The Foreign Affairs committee was most active on the
storage dimension, because that dimension involves questions about the reprocess-
ing of used nuclear material, which raises questions about nuclear proliferation.
Finally, the Budget committee mostly heard testimony about Yucca Mountain.
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This is likely because the failure of Yucca Mountain to become operational has
major budget implications because of the nuclear waste trust fund and the liabil-
ities associated with the failure of the government to take possession of the used
nuclear material at the various power plants as stipulated by the NWPA. The next
section examines the relevant Senate committees.
4.4.2 Senate
To test the first hypothesis with regard to the Senate, I examine the six Senate
committees active in the UNF subsystem. The committees and the number of
hearings, number of witnesses, and the number of Congresses are shown in Table
4.3.
Table 4.3: UNF Subsystem Activity by Senate Committee
Committee Hearings Witnesses Congresses
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 1 9 1
Appropriations 3 10 2
Commerce, Science, and Transportation 5 64 3
Energy and Natural Resources 26 211 12
Environment and Public Works 11 175 8
Governmental Affairs 3 51 3
Number of hearings χ2(53.98) significant at p < 0.001
Within the Senate, jurisdiction over UNF was largely dominated by one com-
mittee, Energy and Natural Resources.9 This committee held the most hearings,
by far, with 26. In addition, they saw the most witnesses with 211, and were active
across the most Congresses at 12. As with the House results, the χ2 (53.98) for the
number of hearings in the Senate is significant, providing evidence for H1. The En-
vironment and Public Works committee had the second highest number of hearings
with 11, less than half of the Energy and Natural Resources committee, yet they
9Senator J. Bennett Johnson who, as discussed in Chapter 3, was instrumental in the devel-
opment of UNF policy served on the Energy and Natural Resources committee for many years,
and was the committee chair from 1987 to 1995 (Vandenbosch and Vandenbosch, 2007).
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saw 175 witnesses and held hearings across 8 Congresses. The Commerce, Science,
and Transportation committee held 5 hearings, Appropriations and Governmental
Affairs each held 3 hearings, and the Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry commit-
tee held 1 hearing. As with the hearings in the House, I examine the differences
of attention paid to each dimension by Senate committee using OLS models with
robust standard errors. The Senate committees are dummy variables and the ex-
cluded referent is the Energy and Natural Resources committee.
Table 4.4: OLS Estimates of Dimension Salience by Senate Committee
Program Safe Yucca Site Sci/Tech Storage Trans
(Intercept) 0.32∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ −0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Agriculture −0.13∗ −0.04 −0.01 0.06 −0.06∗ −0.00 0.18∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Appropriations −0.02 0.10† −0.03 −0.03 0.03 −0.08∗ 0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Comm/Sci/Trans −0.22∗∗∗ 0.05∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.04∗ −0.01 −0.02 0.26∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Environment/Public Works −0.03† 0.01 −0.01 0.00 −0.01 −0.00 0.03∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Governmental Affairs −0.05 0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.05∗ 0.03 0.09∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Republican Majority −0.03 0.00 −0.00 0.05∗∗∗ −0.02† −0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Legislative −0.03∗ −0.03∗ −0.01† 0.04∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 501 501 501 501 501 501 501
adj. R2 0.19 0.15 0.53 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.25
Resid. sd 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.12
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effect for eras not shown
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
Table 4.4 present the results of the OLS analysis. As with the House, there
are significant differences in the salience of the dimensions across the Senate com-
mittees, although these differences don’t seem as pronounced. The Agriculture
committee was less likely to find the programmatic and the science and technical
dimensions salient, compared to the Energy and Natural Resources committee, but
was more likely to find the transportation dimension salient. The Appropriations
committee found the safety/regulation more salient, using a one-tailed test, and the
storage dimension less salient, all else equal. The Commerce, Science, and Trans-
portation committee was more likely to pay attention to the safety/regulation and
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transportation dimensions, and less likely to pay attention to the programmatic,
Yucca Mountain, and site selection dimensions. The Environment and Public
Works, the second most active committee, was similar to the Energy and Natural
Resources, only differing in paying less attention to the programmatic dimension,
in a one-tailed test, and more attention to the transportation dimension. Finally,
Governmental Affairs was less likely to pay attention to science and technical issues
and more likely to pay attention to the transportation dimension.
In regards to the control variables, when Republicans hold the majority in the
Senate, on average the site selection dimension is more salient and the science
and technical dimension was less salient in a one-tailed test. The programmatic,
safety/regulation, Yucca Mountain, and the science and technical dimensions were
all less salient in Senate hearings that considered legislation versus other hearings.
The site selection, storage, and transportation dimensions were all more salient in
legislative hearings, all else equal.
As with the House models, the Senate models were used to make point pre-
dictions for each dimension within each of the committees. These results are
illustrated in Figure 4.3.
As can be seen in Figure 4.3, the results for the Senate committees show at-
tention more evenly divided among the dimensions. Holding all else equal, the
Energy and Natural Resources committee was most likely to hear testimony on
the programmatic dimension, which an estimated mean of 0.32. In addition, the
Energy and Natural Resources committee was estimated to hear no testimony on
the transportation dimension. The transportation dimension was salient however,
for the Environment and Public Works committee (the other core committee in the
UNF subsystem) with an estimated 30% of the testimony being about transporta-
tion. The transportation dimension was also salient for the Commerce, Science,
and Transportation committee with an estimated 0.26.
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Figure 4.3: Estimated Dimension Salience for each Senate Committee
Energy and
Natural Resources
Es
tim
at
ed
 S
al
ie
nc
e
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
Program Safe Yucca Site Sci/Tech Storage Transportation
Agriculture, Nutrition
and Forestry
Es
tim
at
ed
 S
al
ie
nc
e
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
0.
30
Program Safe Yucca Site Sci/Tech Storage Transportation
Appropriations
Es
tim
at
ed
 S
al
ie
nc
e
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
Program Safe Yucca Site Sci/Tech Storage Transportation
Commerce, Science,
and Transportation
Es
tim
at
ed
 S
al
ie
nc
e
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
Program Safe Yucca Site Sci/Tech Storage Transportation
Environment and Public Works
Es
tim
at
ed
 S
al
ie
nc
e
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
0.
30
Program Safe Yucca Site Sci/Tech Storage Transportation
Governmental Affairs
Es
tim
at
ed
 S
al
ie
nc
e
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
0.
30
Program Safe Yucca Site Sci/Tech Storage Transportation
The first hypothesis posited that the number of committees involved int he UNF
subsystem with be limited to a few core committees that anchor the subsystem.
Much like the House results, the Senate results seem to confirm this expectation.
The central Senate committee was the Energy and Natural Resources committee
which held the most hearings at 26, saw the most witnesses with 211, and held
hearings in 12 Congresses. The second hypothesis stated that committee involve-
ment in the UNF subsystem, outside of the anchor committees, would be limited
and based on committee expertise and jurisdiction. Evidence in support of this hy-
pothesis was weaker in the Senate compared to the findings for the House. While,
the Commerce, Science, and Transportation committee was most active on the
transportation dimension and less active on other dimensions overall, as compared
to the House, the Senate seemed to have committees more active across several
dimensions. This may be because the Senate has traditionally been less reliant
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on committees than the House (Stewart, 2001), possibly because the Senate has
only 100 members compared to the House with 435. The smaller number of mem-
bers may mean that committees need to have broader expertise and jurisdictional
boundaries. For example, the Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry committee held
only one hearing, from 1975 to 2012, about UNF. It took place in the 96th Congress
(1980), and was focused on the impact of a nuclear waste site on rural communi-
ties (US Senate, 1980). While seemingly narrow in scope and bound by committee
expertise—rural communities are certainly closely related to agriculture issues—
this hearing touched on many of the dimensions of UNF. It was just as likely as
the anchor committee to focus on safety/regulation, site selection and storage di-
mensions; and more likely to pay attention to the transportation dimension. An
additional reason may be that the Senate rules give individual senators a lot of
latitude to influence the larger chamber and these dynamics allow opportunities
for Senators to expand the jurisdictional span of their committee(s). For example,
Harry Reid, during the 108th Congress was the ranking member of the Appro-
priations subcommittee on Energy and Water Development. This subcommittee
had some expertise in the issue of UNF largely because they appropriated funds
for the Yucca Mountain project. In the 108th Congress two hearings were held
by this subcommittee, one of these hearings (discussed in Chapter 3) was focused
on workers at Yucca Mountain being exposed to silica (US Senate, 2004), which
would seem to be outside the purview of the Appropriations committee. This is an
example of a powerful committee member leveraging involvement in one part of an
issue—funding in this case—in an attempt to focus attention on other dimensions
of the UNF issue.
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4.5 Summary
This chapter examined the role of institutions in processing information and defin-
ing policy issues. Institutions structure policy subsystems by their expertise and
jurisdictional authority. This expertise and authority results from the parallel
processing of issues that a complex policymaking environment requires. In other
words, the parallel processing of information across various sub-units within an
institution encourages the development and concentration of expertise and re-
duces overall information costs for policymakers. In addition, committees attempt
to leverage this expertise to expand their influence into other policy subsystems.
These factors combine to allow institutions great latitude to influence issue defi-
nitions by signaling the salient dimensions of an issue to the full Congress. This
chapter looked at the activity of Congressional committees in the UNF subsys-
tem and found that a few core committees were most likely to hold hearings.
A second finding, was that committees tended to vary in the attention paid to
each dimension largely based on the committees realm of expertise. In short,
the core subsystem committees were spread across several of the dimensions and
outlier committees were more narrowly focused. Overall, the conclusion is that
institutions take information and shape issue definitions through expertise and
jurisdictional competition.
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Chapter 5
Policy Actors, Information, and Issue Definitions
Previous chapters have demonstrated that the issue of UNF is dynamic and com-
plex, and that Congressional committees within policy subsystems compete for
influence in a subsystem based on their expertise. This chapter shifts the focus
from institutions to policy actors active within the UNF subsystem. Specifically,
this chapter examines how policy actors shape, or attempt to shape, the infor-
mation that is made available to policymakers. A complex policymaking environ-
ment leads to disproportionate information processing—where some information is
weighted more than other information—however there are likely to be systematic
elements that influence which issue dimensions are salient at a given time. One
possible category of influence explored in this chapter is strategic policy actors.
These actors can alter the nature and content of information that they present to
policymakers through strategic framing. As discussed in Chapter 1, information
is characterized as signals in the policymaking environment, and these signals can
consist of the issue dimensions that the source of the signal finds most relevant.
By signaling which dimensions are salient, policy actors can shape how the issue
is defined. In short, as the analysis in this chapter will demonstrate, policy actors
attempt to define issues in systematic ways by highlighting some dimensions over
others.
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5.1 Strategic Policy Actors and Issue Dimensions
Policy actors are defined as individuals or groups with an interest, expertise, and
sustained involvement in a policy subsystem. These can include individual policy
entrepreneurs, federal agencies, interest groups, and/or coalitions. Policy actors
seek to influence policy choices1 and can be motivated to do so by material interests
and/or purposive beliefs (Wilson, 1973; Moe, 1981; Jenkins-Smith and Clair, 1993;
Sabatier and Weible, 2007) or they can be motivated by expertise and the norm of
“neutral competence” (Weimer, 2005). Finally, policy actors are strategic in the
way(s) that they attempt to influence collective policy choices.
Policy actors employ multiple strategies in attempting to influence public pol-
icy. One way that actors seek to shape policy choices is by attempting to define
policy issues in a manner that advantages their preferred positions. For example,
policy actors may attempt to frame or redefine a policy issue to alter the scope
of conflict surrounding that issue. Since at least Schattschneider (1960), scholars
have argued that policy actors attempt to either expand or contain conflict in a
policy area. Actors that perceive themselves to be “winning” attempt to contain
conflict within the established policy subsystem in an effort to maintain the sta-
tus quo, whereas actors that perceive themselves as “losing” attempt to expand
conflict to disrupt the status quo. Framing an issue in the broadest possible terms
can attract other policy actors to become concerned about the issue. Therefore,
policy actors that view themselves as losing a particular policy battle may attempt
to redefine a policy issue to appeal to a broader (and more sympathetic) audience
(Pralle, 2006).
Policy issues that are multidimensional and complex, like UNF management,
offer opportunities for the strategic manipulation of issue dimensions by motivated
1Note that for analytical clarity policy actors are considered distinct from policy or decision
makers, however there is certainty much overlap as some policy actors are also policymakers (e.g.,
federal agencies, elected officials).
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policy actors. In essence, issue complexity allows policy actors to highlight certain
dimensions over others in an attempt to frame or define a policy issue. That is the
key insight behind Riker’s heresthetics (see Riker, 1984, 1986, 1990; Shepsle, 2003;
Moser, Patty and Penn, 2009). Heresthetics involve policy actors constructing the
issue space in a way that promotes their preferred outcome. Often, this is accom-
plished by adding new dimensions to an issue that will expand the conflict to draw
in new actors and/or split the dominant coalition (Riker, 1986). For example, in
the early 1970’s the Department of Defense proposed bringing shipments of nerve
gas weapons from Japan through the port of Seattle. These weapons would then
be transported by rail through Washington State to Oregon to be decommissioned.
Senator Magnuson of Washington was firmly against this proposal, and was suc-
cessful in rallying a critical number of Senators to block the proposal by arguing
that the Senate had not been given a voice in the treaty negotiations with Japan.
This argument moved enough conservative Senators, who were chiefly concerned
about the traditional “advise and consent” role of the Senate, to Magnuson’s side
(this story is discussed in Riker, 1986, 1990; Baumgartner et al., 2009). In a similar
vein, other scholars have noted that policy actors “problem surf” in attempt to at-
tach their preferred solution to a salient policy problem (Kingdon, 1984; Boscarino,
2009). Attaching a solution to a problem involves altering the issue space in an
attempt to redefine an issue.
5.2 Policy Actors in the Used Nuclear Fuel Domain
As noted above, policy actors are individuals or groups that have a sustained
involvement in a policy issue or area. Often these actors are motivated by ex-
pertise, material interest, and/or purposive beliefs to become engaged in a sub-
system. These motivations are not mutually exclusive, and most policy actors
develop expertise in the issues in which they engage (Baumgartner et al., 2009).
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Indeed, multiple actors competitively pursuing their own policy preferences can as-
sist Congress in creating policies where the benefits to society as a whole outweigh
the costs (Esterling, 2004). The expertise and preferences of policy actors shape
the information they provide to policymakers regarding the dimensions of an issue
that are most salient. However, preferences among policy actors in a subsystem are
often divergent, therefore policy actors likely vary systematically in the attention
they pay to particular dimensions of an issue.
Policy actors within a given subsystem often include a wide range of individuals
and groups. Knowing the dimensions of the UNF issue and some of the motiva-
tions of the various policy actors, hypotheses can be derived about the dimensions
that particular policy actor will found most salient. Below is a discussion of the
major policy actors involved in the UNF subsystem, as determined by appearing
as witnesses in Congressional hearings regarding UNF. Following each discussion,
I posit hypotheses about which dimensions those actors will choose to highlight.
5.2.1 Federal Agencies
Federal agencies provide expertise and knowledge about policy issues. As a result,
Congress makes use of federal agencies in an attempt to lower information costs
(see Krause, 2010). Traditionally, scholars have noted that federal agencies reduce
search costs for Congress by providing valuable knowledge and expertise (Gailmard
and Patty, 2007). More recent work has indicated that a “dual dynamic” exists be-
tween Congress and federal agencies. This dual dynamic incorporates a top-down
aspect where Congress delegates policymaking authority to the bureaucracy and a
bottom-up aspect where federal agencies process and package relevant information
in the environment for Congress (Workman, 2009; Workman, Jones and Jochim,
2010). These dynamics imply a bureaucracy that is responsive to Congressional
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oversight.2
Federal agencies have played an extensive role in the UNF issue. As seen in
Chapter 3, the DOE is the agency in charge of developing and charaterizing a
site for the disposal of UNF, and the NRC and EPA and the agencies charged
with regulating the facility.3 Given that federal agencies often provide expertise to
Congress, and federal agencies, such as the DOE, NRC, and the EPA, are heavily
involved in the implementation of policies and the development of regulations
surrounding used nuclear materials, I posit the following hypothesis:
H1: Federal Agencies are more likely to discuss the programmatic,
safety/regulation, and scientific/technical dimensions, relative to other
groups
5.2.2 Interest Groups
Like federal agencies, interest groups can also provide expertise to Congress. Com-
petition among interest groups with a developed expertise can help Congress in
forming policies that are more efficient than they might be otherwise (Esterling,
2004). In addition, interest groups, through lobbying, can provide a “subsidy” to
policymakers by providing their allies with relevant policy information (Hall and
Deardorff, 2006). However, interest groups often have a specific policy goal in mind
and attempt to influence policy choices to meet those goals. To achieve these goals
interest groups are strategic and employ several strategies aimed at influencing col-
2However, bureaucrats can also be motivated by interests and beliefs to pursue certain policy
goals (Downs, 1967; Carpenter, 2001; Meier and O’Toole, 2006). It is likely that the different
federal agencies will vary in some of their interests and beliefs, however all federal agencies can
be assumed to have acquired some level of expertise. The question I am interested in involves
federal agencies and what dimensions they would highlight relative to the other groups. Further
research should explore differences in dimension salience across the various federal agencies.
3It should be noted that federal agencies are also policymakers. In addition, agency hearings
and rulemaking procedures can act as policymaking venues for other policy actors. However,
for my purposes I only consider the role of federal agencies as policy actors and Congress as
policymakers.
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lective policy choice. These include the way they share information (Austen-Smith
and Wright, 1994), the selection of policymaking venue (Baumgartner and Jones,
1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Boehmke, Gailmard and Patty, 2013),
and the way that they frame and attempt to define policy issues (Baumgartner
et al., 2009).
The interest groups involved in UNF fall largely into one of two camps; industry
groups or environmental groups. Industry groups represent the nuclear energy
industry and are assumed to be largely motivated by material interests. Therefore,
these groups are likely to be concerned about the future viability of nuclear energy.
The unresolved issue of how to handle UNF has long been thought to undermine
the continued and expanded use of nuclear energy (see Walker, 2009). This concern
became more relevant following the decision to forgo reprocessing of used material
in 1976. As a result, I posit the following hypothesis:
H2: Industry Groups are more likely to discuss the storage dimen-
sion, relative to other groups
Environmental groups are largely motivated by beliefs and values related to
the protection of the environment. While many environmentalists were initially
favorable toward nuclear energy, beginning in the late 1960’s environmental groups
began to shift away from nuclear energy (Duffy, 1997). At first, this was due
to thermal pollution run-off and its impact on fish and other wildlife, but by
the mid 1970’s these groups became concerned about the perceived harm nuclear
materials can cause to the environment, and human health and safety. In general,
environmental groups are likely to perceive increased risks associate with nuclear
energy. Given the nature of the perceived risks, environmental groups are also
likely to be concerned about the process of selecting a site for the storage of
nuclear material. As noted, the unresolved nature of UNF disposal can work
to undermine the further use of nuclear energy, therefore environmental groups
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are likely to highlight the site selection dimension in an attempt to prevent the
successful siting of a UNF facility. Therefore, I posit that:
H3: Environmental Groups are more likely to discuss the safety/regulation
and site selection dimensions, relative to other groups
5.2.3 State and Local
Given the importance of Federalism in the US context, state and local individuals
and groups are important actors in many federal government decisions. Federalism
has played a large role in the UNF subsystem and has given rise to contentious
debates between the federal government and the potential host states (Kearney
and Garey, 1982; Carter, 1987). Throughout the development of nuclear waste
policy potential host states were consistently opposed to being selected to host
a repository. The concerns of these states often centered around the “top-down”
approach to the process of site selection adopted by the federal government, which
lead many states to distrust the process and the DOE in particular (Clary and
Kraft, 1988). In addition, some state opposition could be a result of Not-In-My-
BackYard (NIMBY) sentiments from residents of states that are being considered
to host a site that is potentially risky (Kraft, 1991).4 An additional risk that
concerns state/local actors is the transportation of potentially hazardous materials
through their state and local areas (MacGregor et al., 1994; Gawande and Jenkins-
Smith, 2001; Gawande, Jenkins-Smith and Yuan, 2013).
In addition to state and local actors, native american actors have also been
in active in the UNF subsystem. Several native american tribes have consid-
ered or been approached to host UNF facilities, yet they have raised many of the
4However NIMBY beliefs are complicated (Benford, Moore and Williams, 1993; Jenkins-Smith
et al., 2011), making the NIMBY arguments a little less clear. The story is even more complicated
when considering tensions between local communities and states. In many cases, such as Lyons,
Kansas, Carlsbad, New Mexico, and Nye county Nevada, many of the local officials were in favor
of the facility, and most of the opposition came from other parts of the state (see Walker, 2009).
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same concerns as state and local actors (see Vandenbosch and Vandenbosch, 2007).
Therefore, I include tribal actors as a part of the state and local category. Given
the concerns of state/local/tribal actors, I posit that:
H4: State/Local/Tribal actors are more likely to discuss the site
selection and transportation dimensions, relative to other groups
5.2.4 Elected Officials
Elected officials play two roles often simultaneously, they are policy actors attempt-
ing to influence policy choices and policymakers charged with making many policy
decisions. The focus here is on elected officials as policy actors attempting to shape
policy choices. Major motivations of elected officials have been argued to include
reelection, power within the chamber, and good public policy (Fenno, 1973). These
motivations are why elected officials might seek to shape policy choices and define
issues. In the UNF subsystem, elected officials largely act as representatives to
their geographical area and attempt to prevent their state or local area from being
selected as a host site for a repository. As a result, it is likely that their concerns
match those of state/local actors.
H5: Elected Officials are more likely to discuss the site selection and
transportation dimensions, relative to other groups
5.3 Data and Methods
Once again, the data for the analysis performed in this chapter is drawn from the
140 Congressional hearings regarding used nuclear fuel from 1975 to 2012. These
hearings were coded for the witness and the witness’s affiliation. The data on
witness affiliation is used to place witness into one of seven categories, which are
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described below, and these witness categories are the main independent variables
for this chapter.
Dependent Variables : As in Chapter 4, the dependent variables are the seven
dimensions of the UNF policy debate that were derived from hearing testimony
and described in detail in Chapter 2. The values for the dimensions range from
0 to 1, with values closer to 1 indicating a higher proportion of that testimony
was about that dimension, thereby indicating a higher degree of salience for that
dimension with that policy actor. The next section describes the independent
variables used in this chapter.
Independent Variables : The major variables of interest for this chapter are the
policy actors involved in the UNF subsystem. For my purposes, policy actors
are identified as those that appear as witnesses in a committee hearing. Apart
from policy actors, I also control for several other factors that might influence the
salience of the various dimensions.
Policy Actors
To examine group based differences, witnesses were categorized by group affiliation
and then aggregated into one of seven major categories; federal agencies, state/local
interests, elected officials, industry interest groups, environmental interest groups,
outside experts and a miscellaneous category. Federal agencies include execu-
tive agency personnel (e.g., DOE, NRC, EPA) and individuals from congressional
agencies (e.g., GAO, CBO). State/Local/Tribal interests include individuals em-
ployed by state agencies, state based interest groups, local government agencies,
and Indian tribes. Elected officials are federal (e.g., Congress), state (e.g., gov-
ernor, state legislature), and local (e.g. mayor, city council).5 Industry interest
5Note that in this analysis elected officials are those that appear as witnesses, not those in
the committee.
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groups include individuals from business and industry groups (e.g., Atomic Indus-
try Forum, Exxon Nuclear Company, General Electric Company, Nuclear Energy
Institute). Environmental interest groups are representatives from environmental
groups (e.g., Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council), and other purposive
interest groups that often focus on environmental issues (e.g., Union of Concerned
Scientists, Public Citizen). Outside experts include scientific and technical experts
from outside government agencies (e.g., academic institutions, national laborato-
ries, professional associations). Table 5.1 shows the number of witnesses by policy
actor type.
Table 5.1: Number of Witnesses per Policy Actor Type
Policy Actor Number of Witnesses Percent
Federal Agencies 368 29%
State/Local/Tribal 316 25%
Elected Officials 175 14%
Industry Groups 114 9%
Environmental Groups 100 8%
Outside Experts 136 11%
Misc 62 5%
As can be seen, federal agencies had the highest number of witnesses with 368
(29%), followed by state/local/tribal with 316 (25%). Elected officials had the
third highest number with 175 (14%), followed by outside experts with 136 (11%),
industry groups with 114 (9%), and environmental groups with 100 (8%). Finally,
the misc category, made up of witnesses that weren’t affiliated with any particular
group and only appeared in one Congress (e.g., private citizens, the actor Robert
Redford), had the fewest number of witnesses with 62 (5%).
The focus of this chapter is how policy actors attempt to strategically shape is-
sue definitions. However, the ability of policy actors to shape issues may be limited
by the institutional features in which they operate (Sheingate, 2006; Baumgartner
et al., 2009). Therefore, the models used to test the hypotheses in this chapter
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contain several institutional characteristics as control variables. As seen in Chap-
ter 4, there is substantial variation in the salience of dimensions across the various
committees. Therefore, I use fixed effects for committees with the Senate Agri-
culture, Nutrition, and Forestry committee as the excluded referent committee.
In addition, I include the controls from Chapter 4; hearing type, Republican ma-
jority, and UNF policy era. As a reminder, legislative is coded 1 if the hearings
is a legislative hearing, and 0 if otherwise, and Republican majority is coded 1 if
Republicans are in the majority in the chamber in which the hearing occurred,
and 0 otherwise. Finally, I use fixed effects to control for the four policy eras of
UNF policy evolution. The to test the hypotheses OLS regression with robust
standard errors was used.6 In addition, the analysis was performed separately for
each policy actor type. The results are presented in the next section.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Federal Agencies
Actors within federal agencies are often key players in policy subsystems. One
of their key functions is to provide expertise and knowledge about the issues rel-
evant to the subsystem. Following from this assumption, the first hypothesis,
H1, posited that relative to other groups federal agencies are more likely to focus
on the programmatic, safety/regulation, and scientific/technical dimensions. As
noted above, this hypothesis is tested using OLS models with robust standard er-
rors. To compare federal agencies to the other policy actors, they are the excluded
referent group in the following analysis. Evidence in support of the working hy-
pothesis would be negative and statistically significant estimated coefficients for
6Given the hierarchical nature of the data (Committees in chamber; chamber in Congress) I
also used a mixed effects model, with random effects for Congress and committee. The results
were very similar, so OLS was used for ease of interpretation.
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each group in the models predicting the programmatic, safety/regulation, and sci-
entific/technical dimensions. The results are presented in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: OLS Estimates of Federal Agencies and Dimension Salience
Program Safe Yucca Site Sci/Tech Storage Trans
(Intercept) 0.28∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Industry Groups −0.10∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ 0.02∗ 0.05∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Environmental Groups −0.09∗∗∗ −0.02∗ −0.01 0.12∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
State/Local/Tribal −0.05∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.00 0.12∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.01 0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Elected Officials −0.14∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗ −0.00 0.20∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02†
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Outside Experts −0.14∗∗∗ 0.02 0.01 0.07∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.02 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Misc −0.17∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.02∗ 0.17∗∗∗ −0.03∗ 0.04∗ 0.02†
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Republican Majority −0.01 0.00 0.01∗ 0.03∗∗ −0.00 −0.02∗ −0.01†
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Legislative 0.02∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.00 0.01 −0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 1271 1271 1271 1271 1271 1271 1271
adj. R2 0.29 0.33 0.60 0.42 0.17 0.30 0.23
Resid. sd 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects for committee and era not shown
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
As can be seen in the first column of Table 5.2, all other groups, as expected,
were significantly less likely then federal agencies to discuss the programmatic
dimension, all else equal. Also as expected, all groups except outside experts
were significantly less likely then federal agencies to discuss the safety/regulation
dimension. Finally, all groups but outside experts were less likely to discuss the
science/technical dimension. In fact, outside experts were significantly more likely
than federal agencies to highlight the science/technical dimension. This is likely
because outside experts are largely scientific and technical experts drawn from
various universities and research centers and policymakers are drawing on their
expertise in conjunction with the expertise provided by federal agencies. In general,
these results confirm my expectations as federal agencies were significantly more
likely to discuss the programmatic, safety/regulation, and the science/technical
dimensions than all other actors but outside experts.
100
In terms of the dimensions that were not hypothesized, federal agencies were
less likely than industry groups to highlight the Yucca Mountain dimension. In
addition, they were less likely to discuss site selection than the other groups. This
is likely because the site selection dimension deals with the politics of the site
selection process. As a result, the involvement of federal agencies in site selection
is likely within the programmatic and science/technical dimensions rather than
the site selection dimension. Finally, they were less likely then industry groups to
discuss the storage dimension.
For the control variables, Yucca Mountain and site selection, all else equal,
tended to be more salient with Republicans in the majority, whereas the sci-
ence/technical and transportation (in a one-tailed test) were less likely to be salient.
Finally, for the legislative hearings the programmatic and transportation dimen-
sion were more salient, and the safe/regulation and science/technical dimensions
were less salient than during nonlegislative hearings, all else equal.7
5.4.2 Interest Groups
Broadly speaking, two types of interest groups are involved in the UNF subsys-
tem; industry groups and environmental groups. Industry groups largely represent
utility companies and others involved in the production of nuclear energy. The
resolution of the UNF issue is critical for the continued use of nuclear energy.
Therefore, hypothesis H2 posited that, relative to other groups, industry groups
would likely highlight the storage dimension. The results are shown in Table 5.3.
Looking first at storage, as expected industry groups were significantly more
likely than any other actor to highlight that dimension. This result is highly
statistically significant across all other policy actors. In addition, the industry
groups were more likely than the other major policy actors to discuss the Yucca
7The results for the control variable are the same across all policy actors, so they will not be
discussed again.
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Table 5.3: OLS Estimates of Industry Groups Dimension Salience
Program Safe Yucca Site Sci/Tech Storage Trans
(Intercept) 0.18∗∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Federal Agencies 0.10∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ −0.02∗ −0.05∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Environmental Groups 0.01 0.03∗∗ −0.03∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
State/Local/Tribal 0.05∗∗ 0.01† −0.02∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.02∗ −0.15∗∗∗ 0.03∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Elected Officials −0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ −0.02∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.02† −0.14∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Outside Experts −0.04∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ −0.01 0.02 0.11∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Misc −0.07∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Republican Majority −0.01 0.00 0.01∗ 0.03∗∗ −0.00 −0.02∗ −0.01†
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Legislative 0.02∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.00 0.01 −0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 1271 1271 1271 1271 1271 1271 1271
adj. R2 0.29 0.33 0.60 0.42 0.17 0.30 0.23
Resid. sd 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects for committee and era not shown
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
Mountain dimension. It likely that industry groups found Yucca Mountain salient
given that it was the only site being considered for a UNF repository. Finally,
industry groups were less likely to discuss the safety/regulation dimension and the
science and technical dimension.
The second type of interest group active in the UNF subsystem are environ-
mental groups. These groups are largely concerned about the impacts of nuclear
energy and UNF on the environment, and human health and safety. Given that
H3 posited that environmental groups would find the safety/regulation and site
selection dimension most salient. The results, with environmental groups are the
excluded referent group, are presented in Table 5.4.
As shown, environmental groups were more likely to discuss the safety/regulation
dimension only relative to industry groups, and state/local actors (in a one-tailed
test). Federal agencies and outside experts were more likely than environmental
groups to discuss the safety/regulation dimension. Perhaps because discussion of
the safety/regulation dimension was extremely technical in nature. In addition,
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Table 5.4: OLS Estimates of Environmental Groups Dimension Salience
Program Safe Yucca Site Sci/Tech Storage Trans
(Intercept) 0.18∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Federal Agencies 0.09∗∗∗ 0.02∗ 0.01 −0.12∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ −0.03∗ −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Industry Groups −0.01 −0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ −0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
State/Local/Tribal 0.04∗ −0.02† 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.04∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Elected Officials −0.05∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.08∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.03∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Outside Experts −0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.02 −0.05∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Misc −0.07∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.01 0.05∗ 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Republican Majority −0.01 0.00 0.01∗ 0.03∗∗ −0.00 −0.02∗ −0.01†
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Legislative 0.02∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.00 0.01 −0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 1271 1271 1271 1271 1271 1271 1271
adj. R2 0.29 0.33 0.60 0.42 0.17 0.30 0.23
Resid. sd 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects for committees and eras not shown
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
federal agencies were also hypothesized to find that dimension salient, compared to
other groups. Environmental groups were significantly more likely to discuss the
site selection dimension than were federal agencies, industry groups, and outside
experts. However, they were just as likely to discuss site selection as state/local
actors, but less likely than elected officials. Once again however, other groups,
state/local and elected officials in this case, were hypothesized to find those di-
mensions salient. Overall, these results provide some tentative evidence in support
of H3. Compared to their interest group counterparts industry groups, environ-
mental groups were, as expected, more likely to highlight the safety/regulation and
site selection dimension.
5.4.3 State/Local/Tribal
State/local/tribal actors represent particular states, counties, cities, and native
lands. In most cases these actors were involved in the UNF subsystem because
they were, at one point, being considered as a potential location to host a UNF
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facility. As a result, H4 posited that state/local/tribal actors would find the site
selection and transportation dimension most salient. The results are shown in
Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: OLS Estimates of State/Local/Tribal Actors Dimension Salience
Program Safe Yucca Site Sci/Tech Storage Trans
(Intercept) 0.22∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Federal Agencies 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.12∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Industry Groups −0.05∗∗ −0.01† 0.02∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.02∗ 0.15∗∗∗ −0.03∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Environmental Groups −0.04∗ 0.02† −0.00 −0.00 0.01 0.04∗∗∗ −0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Elected Officials −0.09∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.00 0.08∗∗∗ −0.00 0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Outside Experts −0.09∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.05∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.02∗ −0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Misc −0.11∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ −0.02∗ 0.05∗ 0.02 0.04∗∗ −0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Republican Majority −0.01 0.00 0.01∗ 0.03∗∗ −0.00 −0.02∗ −0.01†
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Legislative 0.02∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.00 0.01 −0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 1271 1271 1271 1271 1271 1271 1271
adj. R2 0.29 0.33 0.60 0.42 0.17 0.30 0.23
Resid. sd 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects for committees and eras not shown.
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
As can be seen, state/local/tribal actors were, as expected, significantly more
likely than federal agencies and industry groups to discuss the site selection di-
mension. However, they were less likely than elected officials to discuss that
dimension. In terms of the transportation dimension, state/local/tribal actors
were significantly more likely than federal agencies and industry groups to dis-
cuss that dimension. In addition, state/local/tribal actors were more likely than
all actors, except federal agencies, to discuss the programmatic dimension. This
is likely because state/local/tribal actors include representative from state agen-
cies that are charged with the development and implementation of UNF programs
within their state. Once again, tentative support was found for my expectations.
State/local/tribal actors were more likely to discuss the site selection and trans-
portation dimensions than most other policy actors.
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5.4.4 Elected Officials
Elected officials that appear as witnesses in UNF hearings are largely acting as
representatives of the geographic area. Therefore, as posited by H5, they are likely
to highlight the site selection and transportation dimension. The results are shown
in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6: OLS Estimates of Elected Officials Dimension Salience
Program Safe Yucca Site Sci/Tech Storage Trans
(Intercept) 0.13∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Federal Agencies 0.14∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.00 −0.20∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.02†
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Industry Groups 0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗ −0.15∗∗∗ −0.02† 0.14∗∗∗ −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Environmental Groups 0.05∗∗∗ −0.00 −0.00 −0.08∗∗∗ 0.02 0.03∗ −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
State/Local/Tribal 0.09∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗ −0.00 −0.08∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Outside Experts −0.00 0.04∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.13∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.03∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Misc −0.03† 0.01 −0.02∗ −0.03 0.02 0.03† 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Republican Majority −0.01 0.00 0.01∗ 0.03∗∗ −0.00 −0.02∗ −0.01†
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Legislative 0.02∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.00 0.01 −0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 1271 1271 1271 1271 1271 1271 1271
adj. R2 0.29 0.33 0.60 0.42 0.17 0.30 0.23
Resid. sd 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects for committees and eras not shown
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
As expected, elected official were significantly more likely than all other groups
to discuss the site selection dimension. However, elected officials were only more
likely than federal agencies to discuss the transportation dimension (in a one-tailed
test). In addition, all groups were more likely than elected officials to discuss the
programmatic dimension. These results support my expectations regarding the
site selection dimension, but not the transportation dimension.
5.4.5 Policy Actors and Issue Definitions
In general the results tend to confirm my hypotheses about which dimensions
various policy actors would highlight. As expected, no groups discussed the pro-
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grammatic, safety/regulation, or science/technical dimensions more than federal
agencies. In addition, industry groups found the storage dimension more salient
than all other actors. Environmental groups were more likely than industry groups
to discuss the safety/regulation and site selection. Finally, as expected both
state/local/tribal actors and elected officials were more likely than other actors
to highlight the site selection dimension, however only state/local/tribal actors
were more likely to discuss transportation. These results provided only a partial
confirmation of my hypothesis regarding elected officials.
Next, I use the OLS models to predict the salience of each dimension by policy
actor. For the predictions I held the dummy variables for party control and hearing
type at their medians. The fixed effects for policy eras was held constant at its
mode (the period with the most witnesses), the pre-NWPA era. Finally, the fixed
effects for committees was also held at its mode, the House Natural Resources
committee.8 The estimated means for each policy actor across each dimension are
shown in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7: Predicted Dimension Salience by Policy Actor Type
Dimensions Federal
Agencies
Elected Of-
ficials
Industry
Groups
Environmental
Groups
State/Local/
Tribal
Programmatic 0.25 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.20
Safety/Regulation 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.16
Yucca Mountain 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05
Site Selection 0.09 0.28 0.14 0.21 0.21
Science/Technical 0.19 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.14
Storage 0.16 0.17 0.31 0.19 0.16
Transportation 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.08
Estimates based on OLS models with Rep. majority and leg. hearing at median and eras and committee at mode.
For federal agencies, the programmatic dimension was the most salient. This
was as expected, given the role of federal agencies in developing and implementing
policies and programs to deal with UNF. Also as expected, federal agencies were
more likely to discuss the safety/regulation and the science and technical dimen-
sions, relative to the other actors. This is likely given the nature of expertise that
8This committee had the most witnesses with 314.
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is developed within federal agencies. The storage dimension was the most salient
for the industry interest groups, with an estimated mean of 0.31. In other words,
31% of the testimony given by industry groups is estimated to be about the storage
dimension. This was as expected, because the nuclear industry is concerned about
finding a permanent policy solution for the problem of used materials currently
gathered on nuclear power plant sites across the country. Finally, the site selec-
tion dimension was most salient for elected officials, environmental groups, and
state/local/tribal actors. For elected officials and state/local/tribal actors the site
selection dimension is salient because of the perceived risks associated with nuclear
facilities, and for environmental groups procedural questions of site selection may
act as a wedge, or a policy surrogate (Nie, 2003), to further their ultimate goal of
slowing or abandoning the use of nuclear energy. Overall, each of these actors is
likely concerned about the perceived fairness of the site selection process, which
has always been a highly contentious aspect of UNF policy.
Overall, these results point to how policy actors attempt to shape how issues
are understood. As shown, policy actors attempt to highlight the aspects of an
issue that are most salient to them. This finding provides empirical support for
the idea of heresthetics, where strategic policy actors attempt to construct the
issue in a particular way by highlighting some dimensions over others. Much of
the past work on heresthetics utilized a case study approach (e.g., Riker, 1986),
however the analysis here presented empirical findings showing the systematic ways
in which policy actors communicate which dimensions should be salient. Further
work however, should focus on how new dimensions are brought into the debate.
The approach adopted here allows for the examination of the relative attention paid
to each dimension, yet it does not easily allow for the addition of new dimensions.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the dimensions were selected, in part, based on not
being time or context dependent. Therefore, future work should examine more
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closely the subtle ways that new dimensions, or new frames, are brought into
policy debates.
The results presented here can also speak to other questions relevant to political
scientists and/or policy scholars. For example, questions of political control could
be addressed by examining how the dimension salience for federal agencies shifts
(or doesn’t) based on Presidential or Congressional partisanship. In addition, the
use of expertise in information gathering by Congress can examined. For example,
what type of experts (e.g., federal bureaucrats, university faculty, interest group
scientists) are called on and when? What dimension(s) do these various experts
highlight? Is there variation in the type expert that appears as the policy issue
evolves? In addition, questions of federalism could be examined. Do different
types or representatives, federal, state, or local, vary in the dimensions that they
highlight? Finally, with this data the concerns of native american tribes related
to the siting of a UNF facility can be examined in greater detail than has been
done previously. Overall, the findings presented here are more of a beginning than
a final word.
5.5 Summary
As this chapter has demonstrated, policy actors attempt to highlight some dimen-
sions of an issue over other dimensions in an effort to alter the issue space, thereby
seeking to define the policy issue. This chapter posited and tested a set of hy-
potheses about how policy actors attempt to define policy issues by highlighting
certain dimensions. The tests confirm that policy actors differ systematically in
their presentation of information, and suggest that these actors attempt to strate-
gically employ heresthetics to shape the issue space in a way that advances their
preferred definition of an issue. As was shown, federal agencies tended to high-
light the programmatic, safety/regulation, and scientific and technical dimensions
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of the UNF issue. Industry groups attempted to shift the focus of the issue to the
storage of used nuclear materials. Finally, elected officials, environmental groups,
and state/local/tribal actors all seemed to highlight the site selection dimension.
Overall, these findings supported the notion that policy actors are strategic and
systematic in the way they provide information.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This dissertation developed a model of issue definitions, and then examined how
information can be translated into issue definitions through policy evolution, poli-
cymaking institutions, and policy actors. In this conclusion, I will restate the four
points that were put forth in Chapter 1, discuss the findings in relation to those
points, and discuss further work that should be pursued. The four major points
of dissertation can be stated as:
• Issue definitions are a function of the weighting of the various dimensions of
the issue
• These salience weights can act as signals in an information processing frame-
work
• Dimensions vary in salience over time, and this variation is associated with
policy change
• Institutions and actors within policy subsystems vary in the attention they
pay to the various dimensions
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6.1 Issue Definitions
Issue definitions are a function of the weighting of the
various dimensions of the issue
Issue definitions—the way policy issues are understood—have long been a ma-
jor consideration of policy scholars. However, in the literature, terms like “issue
definition”, “problem definition”, and “issue framing” have often been used in-
terchangeably. Furthermore, when applied these terms largely focus on questions
of agenda setting. How can policy actors get their policy issue and/or their pre-
ferred understanding of their issue onto the policymaking agenda? Moving beyond
questions of agenda setting, I developed a model of issue definitions based on the
underlying attributes (i.e., dimensions) of the issue. As noted, this model is based
on the underlying dimensions of the issue, and this includes dimensions related to
problems and solutions, whereas often these are separate in the literature. The
model can be expressed as:
IDa =
n∑
i=1
si
where si is the salience of dimension i for issue a.
As expressed, issue definitions are function of the sum of each dimension weighted
by its salience. The weights assigned to each dimension can vary over time—
making issue definitions dynamic—and across policy actors.
To estimate the dimensions of the UNF policy debate, I performed LDA analysis
on the opening statements of the 1,271 witnesses that appeared in 140 Congres-
sional hearing about UNF from 1975 to 2012. As described in detail in Chapter 2,
this approach was adopted after consideration of several other possible approaches.
One advantage of the LDA approach is that it assumes multiple topics (i.e., dimen-
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sions) within a single document (i.e., testimony). This allowed for the estimation
of the relative weights that were assigned to each of the seven dimensions for each
witness. A draw back of this approach however, is that dimensions must be de-
fined rather broadly to avoid clusters that are too context dependent (i.e., narrow
or time-specific). In others words, to be able to compare dimension salience over
time and across groups, the dimensions must be consistent and appear across multi-
ple Congresses. While this approach is ideal to estimate the issue definition model,
it does miss some of the nuance associated with particular frames. For example,
national security elements were likely discussed when a) reprocessing was being
considered in the mid-1970s and b) when Yucca Mountain was approved shortly
after the 9-11 terrorist attacks. A topic modeling approach misses some of these
nuances, that can likely only be determined by careful (and costly) human coding.
A second element that is left unaddressed is the tone, positive or negative, about
the dimension. While knowing which dimension was highlighted is important, it
is also important know how that dimension was discussed. In future research, the
issue definition model should be updated to include measures of tone or evaluation
about each dimension. This could be expressed as:
IDa =
n∑
i=1
siei
where si is the salience of dimension i for issue a, and ei is the evaluation of that
dimension.
The evaluation of a dimension could be estimated using sentiment analysis, which
is a dictionary based content analysis approach. Combining the results of the LDA
analysis with sentiment analysis could present a fuller picture of how the issue is
defined.
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Finally, future work should examine the issue definition model across different
types of text documents. For example, Congressional floor speeches could be an-
alyzed in a similar fashion to determine the dimensions that are being debated.
Similarly, comments submitted to federal agencies during the rulemaking process-
ing could also be analyzed. As the amount of text data that is available increases,
more research on the dynamic elements of issue definitions can be realized.
6.2 Information Processing
These salience weights can act as signals in an informa-
tion processing framework
As discussed in Chapter 1, scholars of the policymaking process bound inquiry by
the level of analysis (macro, meso, micro) and the level of abstraction (framework,
theory, model). In this dissertation, I incorporate assumptions from a macro-level
theory of information processing with a model of issue definitions. The theory of
information processing argues that information in the policymaking environment
are signals and that information processing consists of assembling and prioritizing
those signals (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005; Workman, Jones and Jochim, 2009).
Working from this premise, I argued that these information signals can be opera-
tionalized as signals about which of the various dimensions of a policy issue are the
most salient. In other words, information sources (Congressional committees and
policy actors) signal important aspects of a policy issue by highlighting certain di-
mensions over others. In the aggregate this directing of attention is what defines a
policy issue. Considering information as signals about salient dimensions provides
a theoretical bridge from information processing theory to the issue definitions
model.
Given that the information processing theory is a macro-level theory, where the
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unit of analysis are aspects of the entire policymaking system, information signals
are left unspecified. As noted above, I specified information signals as dimensions
of a policy issue within a subsystem, however further work should examine other
specifications. For example, information signals could be considered by type of
information, which can vary from expert-based analysis to normative arguments
(Esterling, 2004, 2011; Weible, 2008). Expert-based policy information is defined
as “content generated by professional, scientific, and technical methods of inquiry”
(Weible, 2008, 615) and is largely focused on the casual mechanisms that connect
policy instruments to policy outcomes. Normative arguments link policy to moral
values or core beliefs about what is “good” or “bad”; “right” or “wrong.” Previous
research has shown that expert-based information is more likely to be utilized
in policy areas with moderate levels of disagreement (Esterling, 2011) and/or in
policy subsystems that are maintained by a dominant coalition or that consist of
collaborative coalitions (Weible, 2008). Further work should seek to incorporate
the dimension(s) that are highlighted with the type of information presented (e.g.,
expert-based vs. normative) to determine which type of information is used to
construct issue definitions.
Apart from the theory of information processing, the issue definition model
could be incorporated into other theories or frameworks of the policy process. For
example, the IDM could be used as a way to operationalize policy core beliefs in
the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). The ACF argues that policy actors ex-
hibit a three-tiered structure of beliefs; with core beliefs, such as political ideology
and/or cultural type, being the most abstract and applicable across multiple pol-
icy domains; followed by policy core beliefs, which are more narrow in scope and
contained within a single policy domain; and secondary beliefs, which are the most
narrow and refer to things like particular policy instruments (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1993; Sabatier and Weible, 2007). A second argument of the ACF, is that
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policy actors in subsystem are best understood as acting within coalitions that
are bound together by policy core beliefs and coordinate their actions. Applied to
the ACF, the IDM could establish shared policy core beliefs by determining which
dimensions are highlighted by the same policy actors. The results from Chap-
ter 5 point to two, or possibly three advocacy coalitions. Environmental groups,
state/local actors, and elected officials tended to highlight the site selection di-
mension, whereas industry groups tended to highlight the storage dimension. This
seems to suggest two coalitions, one centered on the site selection dimension and
the other on questions about storage of UNF. Federal agencies, which highlighted
the programmatic, safety/regulation, and science/technical dimension, may be a
separate coalition, although federal agencies often occupy a middle ground between
opposing coalitions (Jenkins-Smith and Clair, 1993; Sabatier and Zafonte, 1999).
6.3 Policy Evolution and Complexity
Dimensions vary in salience over time, and this variation
is associated with policy change
Understanding policy change is often the goal of policy process theories. In Chap-
ter 3, I examined policy evolution—policy change over time—and how it related
to changes in the salience of the dimensions of the UNF debate. UNF policy devel-
oped over four distinct policy eras that were demarcated by policy changes. After
discussing those eras, I tested a set of hypotheses about which dimensions would
be most salient within each policy era. Using changepoint analysis, I determined
the time and number of changepoints for each of the dimensions, and the time
periods when each dimensions was most salient (had the highest mean) met my
expectations. In addition, these means were statistically significant.
While the analysis presented in Chapter 3 showed associations between the
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salience of the various dimensions and policy change, further work should strive
to link dimension salience with particular policy designs. The next step in re-
search should explore how issue definitions are translated into policy designs. For
example, Chapter 3 illustrated that the safety/regulation dimension was most
salient prior to the NWPA. However, it is not clear how the discussion of the
safety/regulation dimension translated into how the NWPA dealt with that di-
mension. Future work should included considerations of policy design, perhaps
by including legislation into the LDA analysis, and how policy designs connect to
issue definitions.
Next, I examined policy evolution and issue complexity. Issue complexity is
defined as the number of dimensions of an issue under consideration, and I deter-
mined complexity using the Herfindahl index. Complexity was calculated for each
Congress, and the mean complexity of each of the four policy eras were compared.
While the UNF issue declined in complexity across the four policy eras, these de-
clines were not statistically significant. These results indicate that policy issues do
not necessarily become less complex as they evolve.
The issue of UNF remained highly complex for the majority of the period under
study. Future work should examine some of the causal drivers of this complexity.
Clearly, the complexity of the UNF issue is, in part, a function of its multidimen-
sionality. However, future work should connect the appearance of witnesses and
the involvement of committees to variations in issue complexity. It is likely that an
increase in the number of witnesses and committees involved in the UNF subsys-
tem increases complexity, but beyond this, certain actors or committees might be
more likely than others to attempt to attach other dimensions, thereby increasing
complexity. For example, complexity is likely to increase when opponents of a
UNF facility are testifying, as they are likely to attempt to redefine an issue by
attaching other dimensions.
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6.4 Institutions
Institutions and actors within policy subsystems vary in
the attention they pay to the various dimensions
After examining the change in salience of dimensions over time, I turned to the
role of institutions in shaping issue definitions. Institutions help to structure policy
subsystems through their expertise and jurisdictional scope. However, committees
in Congress also attempt to gain influence into other subsystems buy leveraging
their developed expertise. As Chapter 4 demonstrated, in both the House and the
Senate, the UNF subsystem was anchored by one (or two) core committees, with
other committees active on dimensions within their realm of expertise. This was
most evidenced by the Transportation committees, that were more likely to focus
on the transportation dimension.
Committees function as anchoring institutions in subsystems through expertise
and jurisdiction, as noted, but also in their ability to control debate by selecting
witnesses. Future research should examine whether differences existed between
committees in the types of witnesses that they called. For example, were the
core committees more likely to call on federal agencies and/or outside experts in
an effort to make the most informed policy choices? Were the committees that
were attempting to gain traction more likely to call interest groups or others also
attempting to redefine the issue? A policymaking environment that consists of
multiple institutions with competing jurisdictions, such as the UNF subsystem,
offer institutional “opportunity structures” for strategic policy actors to attempt
to redefine issues (Sheingate, 2006; Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Future work should
examine the differences across committees in the types of witnesses they call on to
testify.
In addition, it should be noted that the core committees (i.e., Energy and Com-
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merce, Natural Resources) are those committees that are likely to large have ju-
risdictions, and therefore be involved in multiple subsystems (Baumgartner, Jones
and MacLeod, 2000). As a result, future research should perhaps examine the
various subcommittees active in a subsystem. Subcommittees are likely to have
expertise and jurisdiction that is more narrowly focused within the subsystem.
Therefore, it is likely that much of the work of issue defining occurs within sub-
committees.
6.5 Policy Actors
Moving from institutions, Chapter 5 considered how policy actors attempt to de-
fine policy issues. The policy actors were aggregated into federal agencies, elected
officials, interest groups (industry groups and environmental groups), state/local
actors, outside experts, and a miscellaneous category. Several sets of hypothe-
ses were tested regarding which dimensions would be highlighted by the various
actors. The results, consistent with the hypotheses, showed that federal agen-
cies found the programmatic, safety/regulation, and science/technical dimensions
most salient; elected officials, environmental groups, and state/local actors found
the site selection dimensions most salient; finally, industry groups found the storage
dimension most salient.
The analysis in Chapter 5 compared aggregated groups, future research should
examine intra-group differences. For example, the various federal agencies are
likely to have differences in the dimensions they find most salient. The NRC
and the EPA, the two agencies charged with regulating a UNF facility, are likely
to find the safety/regulation dimension more salient than the DOE. Apart from
intra-group differences, policy actors could be aggregated in different ways. For
example, combining the issue definition model with the ACF, as discussed above,
would aggregate the policy actors into coalitions, based on the dimensions they
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highlight.
While the evidence presented in Chapter 5 indicates that policy actors vary
in the way they define issues, there are some reasons to think that the ability
of policy actors to reframe or completely redefine an issue is limited. The first
reason is that policy institutions have control over the sources of information from
which they draw. For instance, Congressional committees decide what witnesses
to call, which allows powerful committee members the ability to shape the debate
(Jatkowski, 2012). The nature of who gets to testify should be considered (see
Leyden, 1995), however substantive differences in dimension salience across policy
actors remained even after controlling for the committee. This provides some
evidence of the independent effect of policy actors in shaping the ways that issues
are understood.
Apart from institutional constraints, policy actors are limited in their ability to
shape issues by other policy actors. The nature of competition among policy actors
can limit the ability of actors to ensure that their definition of the issue becomes
most prominent. As seen in Chapter 5, policy actors varied in the dimensions they
found most salient, yet it is not clear that any of these dimensions were the basis of
any policy choice(s). In addition, policy actors are experts in their given issue areas,
therefore are likely to be familiar with their own arguments, but also those of their
opponents (Baumgartner et al., 2009). As noted in Chapter 4, institutions and
institutional specialization help to create structure in the complex policymaking
environment. This structure-induced stability is matched by an expertise-induced
stability that exists within policy subsystems. This stability makes the task of
shifting the issue space difficult for any one policy actor.
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